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Title: Information Management as Part of a State’s Effective Implementation of International Safeguards

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  1. ORNL
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Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
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Conference: 2017 INMM - Indian Wells, California, United States of America - 7/17/2017 12:00:00 AM-
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

KOVACIC, DONALD N. Information Management as Part of a State’s Effective Implementation of International Safeguards. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
KOVACIC, DONALD N. Information Management as Part of a State’s Effective Implementation of International Safeguards. United States.
KOVACIC, DONALD N. 2017. "Information Management as Part of a State’s Effective Implementation of International Safeguards". United States. doi:.
title = {Information Management as Part of a State’s Effective Implementation of International Safeguards},
author = {KOVACIC, DONALD N.},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month = 7

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  • The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have createdmore » a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.« less
  • This paper reports that safeguards equipment for nuclear facilities, such as the Modular Integrated Video System (MIVS) manufactured by Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., must operate reliably and unattended over long surveillance periods. To gain confidence in this reliability a comprehensive Quality Assurance Program (QAP) was established for production and acceptance operations. The guidelines for this QAP are contained in the Sandia National Laboratories procedure EP401418, Quality Program Requirements which is a part of the production contract. This procedure contains the nationally recognized elements of a production QA program including organization, specification control, manufacture control, calibration, procurement control, inspection, material control,more » training, quality record, auditing and performance reviews. Aquila has developed and implemented a comprehensive QAP for MIVS production and now is applied company wide for safeguards product.« less
  • President Clinton proposed several initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation in his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly. One initiative was the United States offer to place excess fissile material under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In 1994, three Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were identified as part of a phased approach for initial implementation: the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the Hanford Site in Washington state, and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) near Denver, Colorado. Safeguards implementation began with the initial IAEA inspection of excess highly enriched uranium at Oak Ridge in Septembermore » 1994. The initial inspection of excess plutonium took place at Hanford in December 1994. Preparations for IAEA inspections are underway at Rocky Flats. This paper describes the interactions between the United States and the IABA to prepare for and facilitate these inspections, and the continuing program to provide for the application of IAEA safeguards at DOE facilities. Particular attention is given to the technical exchanges which took place between the IAEA and DOE in preparing for safeguards at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. The approach used at these sites can be applied to future sites if they are selected by the IAEA from the list of US facilities eligible for the application of safeguards.« less
  • A functional test loop capable of simulating UF/sub 6/ flows, pressures, and pipe deposits characteristic of gas centrifuge enrichment plant piping has been designed and fabricated by the Enrichment Safeguards Program of Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. The purpose of the test loop is twofold: (1) to enable the IAEA to evaluate and to calibrate enrichment safeguards measurement instrumentation to be used in limited frequency-unannounced access (LFUA) inspection strategy measurements at gas centrifuge enrichment plants and (2) to train IAEA inspectors in themore » use of such instrumentation. The test loop incorporates actual sections of cascade header pipes from the centrifuge enrichment plants subject to IAEA inspections. The test loop is described, applications for its use by the IAEA are detailed, and results from an initial demonstration session using the test loop are summarized. By giving the IAEA the in-house capability to evaluate LFUA inspection strategy approaches, to develop inspection procedures, to calibrate instrumentation, and to train inspectors, the UF/sub 6/ cascade header pipe test loop will contribute to the IAEA's success in implementing LFUA strategy inspections at gas centrifuge enrichment facilities subject to international safeguards inspections.« less