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Title: Operational Performance Risk Assessment in Support of A Supervisory Control System

Abstract

Supervisory control system (SCS) is developed for multi-unit advanced small modular reactors to minimize human interventions in both normal and abnormal operations. In SCS, control action decisions made based on probabilistic risk assessment approach via Event Trees/Fault Trees. Although traditional PRA tools are implemented, their scope is extended to normal operations and application is reversed; success of non-safety related system instead failure of safety systems this extended PRA approach called as operational performance risk assessment (OPRA). OPRA helps to identify success paths, combination of control actions for transients and to quantify these success paths to provide possible actions without activating plant protection system. In this paper, a case study of the OPRA in supervisory control system is demonstrated within the context of the ALMR PRISM design, specifically power conversion system. The scenario investigated involved a condition that the feed water control valve is observed to be drifting to the closed position. Alternative plant configurations were identified via OPRA that would allow the plant to continue to operate at full or reduced power. Dynamic analyses were performed with a thermal-hydraulic model of the ALMR PRISM system using Modelica to evaluate remained safety margins. Successful recovery paths for the selected scenario aremore » identified and quantified via SCS.« less

Authors:
 [1]; ORCiD logo [2]; ORCiD logo [2]; ORCiD logo [2]
  1. Self Employed
  2. ORNL
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1376424
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: American Nuclear Society NPIC/ANS Meeting - San Francisco, Washington, United States of America - 6/11/2017 12:00:00 AM-6/15/2017 12:00:00 AM
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Denning, Richard S., Muhlheim, Michael David, Cetiner, Sacit M., and Guler Yigitoglu, Askin. Operational Performance Risk Assessment in Support of A Supervisory Control System. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Denning, Richard S., Muhlheim, Michael David, Cetiner, Sacit M., & Guler Yigitoglu, Askin. Operational Performance Risk Assessment in Support of A Supervisory Control System. United States.
Denning, Richard S., Muhlheim, Michael David, Cetiner, Sacit M., and Guler Yigitoglu, Askin. Thu . "Operational Performance Risk Assessment in Support of A Supervisory Control System". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1376424.
@article{osti_1376424,
title = {Operational Performance Risk Assessment in Support of A Supervisory Control System},
author = {Denning, Richard S. and Muhlheim, Michael David and Cetiner, Sacit M. and Guler Yigitoglu, Askin},
abstractNote = {Supervisory control system (SCS) is developed for multi-unit advanced small modular reactors to minimize human interventions in both normal and abnormal operations. In SCS, control action decisions made based on probabilistic risk assessment approach via Event Trees/Fault Trees. Although traditional PRA tools are implemented, their scope is extended to normal operations and application is reversed; success of non-safety related system instead failure of safety systems this extended PRA approach called as operational performance risk assessment (OPRA). OPRA helps to identify success paths, combination of control actions for transients and to quantify these success paths to provide possible actions without activating plant protection system. In this paper, a case study of the OPRA in supervisory control system is demonstrated within the context of the ALMR PRISM design, specifically power conversion system. The scenario investigated involved a condition that the feed water control valve is observed to be drifting to the closed position. Alternative plant configurations were identified via OPRA that would allow the plant to continue to operate at full or reduced power. Dynamic analyses were performed with a thermal-hydraulic model of the ALMR PRISM system using Modelica to evaluate remained safety margins. Successful recovery paths for the selected scenario are identified and quantified via SCS.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Thu Jun 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Conference:
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