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Title: Criticality Safety Evaluation for Small Sample Preparation and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility

Abstract

Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) has reviewed the fissionable material small sample preparation and NDA operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility. This is a Level-1 evaluation conducted in accordance with NCS-AP-004 [Reference 1], formerly NCS-GUIDE-01, and the guidance set forth on use of the Standard Criticality Safety Requirements (SCSRs) [Reference 2]. As stated in Reference 2, the criticality safety evaluation consists of both the SCSR CSED and the SCSR Application CSED. The SCSR CSED is a Level-3 CSED [Reference 3]. This Level-1 CSED is the SCSR Application CSED. This SCSR Application (Level-1) evaluation does not derive controls, it simply applies controls derived from the SCSR CSED (Level-3) for the application of operations conducted here. The controls derived in the SCSR CSED (Level-3) were evaluated via the process described in Section 6.6.5 of SD-130 (also reproduced in Section 4.3.5 of NCS-AP-004 [Reference 1]) and were determined to not meet the requirements for consideration of elevation into the safety basis documentation for CMR. According to the guidance set forth on use of the SCSRs [Reference 2], the SCSR CSED (Level-3) is also applicable to the CMR Facility because the process and the normal and credible abnormal conditions in question aremore » bounded by those that are described in the SCSR CSED. The controls derived in the SCSR CSED include allowances for solid materials and solution operations. Based on the operations conducted at this location, there are less-than-accountable (LTA) amounts of 233U. Based on the evaluation documented herein, the normal and credible abnormal conditions that might arise during the execution of this process will remain subcritical with the following recommended controls.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1374267
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-17-26778
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS; 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; Criticality Safety; Criticality; CSED

Citation Formats

Kunkle, Paige Elizabeth, and Zhang, Ning. Criticality Safety Evaluation for Small Sample Preparation and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1374267.
Kunkle, Paige Elizabeth, & Zhang, Ning. Criticality Safety Evaluation for Small Sample Preparation and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility. United States. doi:10.2172/1374267.
Kunkle, Paige Elizabeth, and Zhang, Ning. 2017. "Criticality Safety Evaluation for Small Sample Preparation and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility". United States. doi:10.2172/1374267. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1374267.
@article{osti_1374267,
title = {Criticality Safety Evaluation for Small Sample Preparation and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility},
author = {Kunkle, Paige Elizabeth and Zhang, Ning},
abstractNote = {Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) has reviewed the fissionable material small sample preparation and NDA operations in Wing 7 Basement of the CMR Facility. This is a Level-1 evaluation conducted in accordance with NCS-AP-004 [Reference 1], formerly NCS-GUIDE-01, and the guidance set forth on use of the Standard Criticality Safety Requirements (SCSRs) [Reference 2]. As stated in Reference 2, the criticality safety evaluation consists of both the SCSR CSED and the SCSR Application CSED. The SCSR CSED is a Level-3 CSED [Reference 3]. This Level-1 CSED is the SCSR Application CSED. This SCSR Application (Level-1) evaluation does not derive controls, it simply applies controls derived from the SCSR CSED (Level-3) for the application of operations conducted here. The controls derived in the SCSR CSED (Level-3) were evaluated via the process described in Section 6.6.5 of SD-130 (also reproduced in Section 4.3.5 of NCS-AP-004 [Reference 1]) and were determined to not meet the requirements for consideration of elevation into the safety basis documentation for CMR. According to the guidance set forth on use of the SCSRs [Reference 2], the SCSR CSED (Level-3) is also applicable to the CMR Facility because the process and the normal and credible abnormal conditions in question are bounded by those that are described in the SCSR CSED. The controls derived in the SCSR CSED include allowances for solid materials and solution operations. Based on the operations conducted at this location, there are less-than-accountable (LTA) amounts of 233U. Based on the evaluation documented herein, the normal and credible abnormal conditions that might arise during the execution of this process will remain subcritical with the following recommended controls.},
doi = {10.2172/1374267},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month = 8
}

Technical Report:

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