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Title: Uranium Enrichment Safeguards

Abstract

DIV of facility layout, material flows, and other information provided in the DIQ. Material accountancy through an annual PIV and a number of interim inventory verifications, including UF6 cylinder identification and counting, NDA of cylinders, and DA on a sample collection of UF6. Application of C/S technologies utilizing seals and tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) on cylinders, containers, storage rooms, and IAEA instrumentation to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection. Verification of the absence of undeclared material and operations, especially HEU production, through SNRIs, LFUA of cascade halls, and environmental swipe sampling

Authors:
 [1];  [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)
OSTI Identifier:
1367804
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-17-25115
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Citation Formats

Demuth, Scott F., and Trahan, Alexis Chanel. Uranium Enrichment Safeguards. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1367804.
Demuth, Scott F., & Trahan, Alexis Chanel. Uranium Enrichment Safeguards. United States. doi:10.2172/1367804.
Demuth, Scott F., and Trahan, Alexis Chanel. Mon . "Uranium Enrichment Safeguards". United States. doi:10.2172/1367804. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1367804.
@article{osti_1367804,
title = {Uranium Enrichment Safeguards},
author = {Demuth, Scott F. and Trahan, Alexis Chanel},
abstractNote = {DIV of facility layout, material flows, and other information provided in the DIQ. Material accountancy through an annual PIV and a number of interim inventory verifications, including UF6 cylinder identification and counting, NDA of cylinders, and DA on a sample collection of UF6. Application of C/S technologies utilizing seals and tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) on cylinders, containers, storage rooms, and IAEA instrumentation to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection. Verification of the absence of undeclared material and operations, especially HEU production, through SNRIs, LFUA of cascade halls, and environmental swipe sampling},
doi = {10.2172/1367804},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Jun 26 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Mon Jun 26 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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  • This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichmentmore » plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.« less
  • The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear materials, and safeguarding uranium enrichment plants is especially important in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s proposed Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) for UF 6 cylinder verification would combine the operator’s accountancy scale with a nondestructive assay system such as the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) and cylinder identification and surveillance systems. In this project, we built a laboratory-scale UCVS and demonstrated its capabilities using mock UF 6 cylinders. We developed a signal processing algorithm to automate the data collection andmore » processing from four continuous, unattended sensors. The laboratory demonstration of the system showed that the software could successfully identify cylinders, snip sensor data at the appropriate points in time, determine the relevant characteristics of the cylinder contents, check for consistency among sensors, and output the cylinder data to a file. This paper describes the equipment, algorithm and software development, laboratory demonstration, and recommendations for a full-scale UCVS.« less
  • In 1972, a working group of the International Atomic Energy Agency identified a goal to develop and evaluate perimeter safeguards for uranium isotope enrichment plants. As part of the United State's response to that goal, Los Alamos Detection and Verification personnel studied gamma-ray and neutron emissions from uranium hexafluoride. They developed instruments that use the emissions to verify uranium enrichment and to monitor perimeter personnel and shipping portals. Unattended perimeter monitors and hand-held verification instruments were evaluated in field measurements and, when possible, were loaned to enrichment facilities for trials. None of the seven package monitoring techniques that were investigatedmore » proved entirely satisfactory for an unattended monitor. They either revealed proprietary information about centrifuge design or were subject to interference by shielding materials that could be present in a package. Further evaluation in a centrifuge facility may help in developing an acceptable attended package monitor. 34 figures, 9 tables.« less
  • Over the last five years, OLEM has been a collaborative development effort involving the IAEA, LANL, ORNL, URENCO, and the NNSA. The collective team has completed the following: design and modelling, software development, hardware integration, testing with the ORNL UF6 Flow Loop, a field trial at the Urenco facility in Almelo, the Netherlands, and a Demonstration at the Urenco USA facility in Eunice, New Mexico. This combined effort culminated in the deployment of several OLEM collection nodes in Iran. These OLEM units are one unattended monitoring system component of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action allowing the International Atomic Energymore » Agency to verify Iran’s compliance with the enrichment production aspects of the agreement.« less
  • The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisitionmore » system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF/sub 6/ cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF/sub 6/ cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF/sub 6/ sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact /sup 252/Cf shuffler for UF/sub 6/ measurements.« less