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Title: Advanced Reactor PSA Methodologies for System Reliability Analysis and Source Term Assessment

Abstract

Beginning in 2015, a project was initiated to update and modernize the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the GE-Hitachi PRISM sodium fast reactor. This project is a collaboration between GE-Hitachi and Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and funded in part by the U.S. Department of Energy. Specifically, the role of Argonne is to assess the reliability of passive safety systems, complete a mechanistic source term calculation, and provide component reliability estimates. The assessment of passive system reliability focused on the performance of the Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) and the inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms of the metal fuel core. The mechanistic source term assessment attempted to provide a sequence specific source term evaluation to quantify offsite consequences. Lastly, the reliability assessment focused on components specific to the sodium fast reactor, including electromagnetic pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, the steam generator, and sodium valves and piping.

Authors:
; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Nuclear Energy
OSTI Identifier:
1365800
DOE Contract Number:
AC02-06CH11357
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 2017 International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles: Next Generation Nuclear Systems for Sustainable Development (FR17), 06/26/17 - 06/29/17, Yekaterinburg, RU
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
Source Term; PSA; Passive Systems; Sodium Fast Reactor

Citation Formats

Grabaskas, D., Brunett, A., Passerini, S., Grelle, A., and Bucknor, M. Advanced Reactor PSA Methodologies for System Reliability Analysis and Source Term Assessment. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Grabaskas, D., Brunett, A., Passerini, S., Grelle, A., & Bucknor, M. Advanced Reactor PSA Methodologies for System Reliability Analysis and Source Term Assessment. United States.
Grabaskas, D., Brunett, A., Passerini, S., Grelle, A., and Bucknor, M. Mon . "Advanced Reactor PSA Methodologies for System Reliability Analysis and Source Term Assessment". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1365800.
@article{osti_1365800,
title = {Advanced Reactor PSA Methodologies for System Reliability Analysis and Source Term Assessment},
author = {Grabaskas, D. and Brunett, A. and Passerini, S. and Grelle, A. and Bucknor, M.},
abstractNote = {Beginning in 2015, a project was initiated to update and modernize the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the GE-Hitachi PRISM sodium fast reactor. This project is a collaboration between GE-Hitachi and Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and funded in part by the U.S. Department of Energy. Specifically, the role of Argonne is to assess the reliability of passive safety systems, complete a mechanistic source term calculation, and provide component reliability estimates. The assessment of passive system reliability focused on the performance of the Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) and the inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms of the metal fuel core. The mechanistic source term assessment attempted to provide a sequence specific source term evaluation to quantify offsite consequences. Lastly, the reliability assessment focused on components specific to the sodium fast reactor, including electromagnetic pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, the steam generator, and sodium valves and piping.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Jun 26 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Mon Jun 26 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Conference:
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  • The PARTITION computer code has been used in the SRS K-reactor Full Scope PSA to cluster the many source terms resulting from the accident progression analysis into a manageable number of averaged source terms. Very little guidance is given in Reference 1 for use of the various options that are available in the program. A series of sensitivity studies has been performed that shows, with a few exceptions, that the mean values and risk measures calculated for the PSA are insensitive to the procedures used to partition the source terms. It was discovered, however, that if too few partitions aremore » used, certain risk measures may be affected due to the source term averaging process.« less
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