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Title: Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities

Abstract

Safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to independently verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to weapons (IAEA, 2017a). Safeguards implemented at uranium enrichment facilities (facilities hereafter) include enrichment monitors (IAEA, 2011). Figure 1 shows a diagram of how a facility could be monitored. The use of a system for monitoring within centrifuge cascades is proposed.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1365512
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-4043
652563
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Citation Formats

Farrar, David R. Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1365512.
Farrar, David R. Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities. United States. doi:10.2172/1365512.
Farrar, David R. Sat . "Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities". United States. doi:10.2172/1365512. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1365512.
@article{osti_1365512,
title = {Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities},
author = {Farrar, David R.},
abstractNote = {Safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to independently verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to weapons (IAEA, 2017a). Safeguards implemented at uranium enrichment facilities (facilities hereafter) include enrichment monitors (IAEA, 2011). Figure 1 shows a diagram of how a facility could be monitored. The use of a system for monitoring within centrifuge cascades is proposed.},
doi = {10.2172/1365512},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Apr 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Sat Apr 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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  • In 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiated an ambitious program of worldwide field trials to evaluate the utility of environmental monitoring for safeguards. Part of this program involved two extensive United States field trials conducted at the large uranium enrichment facilities. The Paducah operation involves a large low-enriched uranium (LEU) gaseous diffusion plant while the Portsmouth facilities include a large gaseous diffusion plant that has produced both LEU and high-enriched uranium (HEU) as well as an LEU centrifuge facility. As a result of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, management of the uranium enrichment operations was assumed bymore » the US Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The facilities are operated under contract by Martin Marietta Utility Services. Martin Marietta Energy Systems manages the environmental restoration and waste management programs at Portsmouth and Paducah for DOE. These field trials were conducted. Samples included swipes from inside and outside process buildings, vegetation and soil samples taken from locations up to 8 km from main sites, and hydrologic samples taken on the sites and at varying distances from the sites. Analytical results from bulk analysis were obtained using high abundance sensitivity thermal ionization mm spectrometers (TIMS). Uranium isotopics altered from the normal background percentages were found for all the sample types listed above, even on vegetation 5 km from one of the enrichment facilities. The results from these field trials demonstrate that dilution by natural background uranium does not remove from environmental samples the distinctive signatures that are characteristic of enrichment operations. Data from swipe samples taken within the enrichment facilities were particularly revealing. Particulate analysis of these swipes provided a detailed ``history`` of both facilities, including the assays of the end product and tails for both facilities.« less
  • This training document provides an introduction on uranium enrichment using a gaseous centrifuge.
  • The design, operati on, and theory underlying the operation of gas centrifuges for the separation of uranium isotopes are described. (J.E.D.)
  • A program is under way to design an effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system that could be applied to the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). This system would integrate nuclear material accountability with containment and surveillance. Uncertainties in material balances due to errors in the measurements of the declared uranium streams have been projected on a yearly basis for GCEP under such a system in a previous study. Because of the large uranium flows, the projected balance uncertainties were, in some cases, greater than the IAEA goal quantity of 75 kg of U-235 contained in low-enriched uranium.more » Therefore, it was decided to investigate the benefits of material balance periods of less than a year in order to improve the sensitivity and timeliness of the nuclear material accountability system. An analysis has been made of projected uranium measurement uncertainties for various short-term material balance periods. To simplify this analysis, only a material balance around the process area is considered and only the major UF/sub 6/ stream measurements are included. That is, storage areas are not considered and uranium waste streams are ignored. It is also assumed that variations in the cascade inventory are negligible compared to other terms in the balance so that the results obtained in this study are independent of the absolute cascade inventory. This study is intended to provide information that will serve as the basis for the future design of a dynamic materials accounting component of the IAEA safeguards system for GCEP.« less
  • An analysis was made of the uncertainties associated with the measurements of the declared uranium streams in the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). The total uncertainty for the GCEP is projected to be from 54 to 108 kg /sup 235/U/year out of a measured total of 200,000 kg /sup 235/U/year. The systematic component of uncertainty of the UF/sub 6/ streams is the largest and the dominant contributor to the total uncertainty. A possible scheme for reducing the total uncertainty is given. (DLC)