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Title: An Approach for Evaluating the Consequence of Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
American Nuclear Society
OSTI Identifier:
1351741
Report Number(s):
BNL-113751-2017-CP
R&D Project: 80956
DOE Contract Number:
SC00112704
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: PSA 2017 Conference (Probabilistic Safety Assessment); Pittsburgh, PA; 20170924 through 20170928
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; Cyber security; thermal-hydraulics; Industrial Control systems (ICS)

Citation Formats

Varuttamaseni A., Bari R., and Youngblood, R. An Approach for Evaluating the Consequence of Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants. United States: N. p., 2017. Web.
Varuttamaseni A., Bari R., & Youngblood, R. An Approach for Evaluating the Consequence of Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants. United States.
Varuttamaseni A., Bari R., and Youngblood, R. 2017. "An Approach for Evaluating the Consequence of Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1351741.
@article{osti_1351741,
title = {An Approach for Evaluating the Consequence of Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants},
author = {Varuttamaseni A. and Bari R. and Youngblood, R.},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month = 9
}

Conference:
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  • This paper provides an approach for developing potential attacks on I and C systems of NPPs and assessing their consequences. An important concept is that the NPPs were not designed to cope with Stuxnet-type of attacks (and any other cyber attacks). That is, the plants were only designed for design basis accidents. The safety margins and redundancies built in the design are all based on design basis accidents. They may be helpful in mitigating cyberattacks, but may not be adequate.
  • The consequences of severe accidents at nuclear power plants can be limited by various protective actions, including emergency responses and long-term measures, to reduce exposures of affected populations. Each of these protective actions involve costs to society. The costs of the long-term protective actions depend on the criterion adopted for the allowable level of long-term exposure. This criterion, called the ``long term interdiction limit,`` is expressed in terms of the projected dose to an individual over a certain time period from the long-term exposure pathways. The two measures of offsite consequences, latent cancers and costs, are inversely related and themore » choice of an interdiction limit is, in effect, a trade-off between these two measures. By monetizing the health effects (through ascribing a monetary value to life lost), the costs of the two consequence measures vary with the interdiction limit, the health effect costs increasing as the limit is relaxed and the protective action costs decreasing. The minimum of the total cost curve can be used to calculate an optimal long term interdiction limit. The calculation of such an optimal limit is presented for each of five US nuclear power plants which were analyzed for severe accident risk in the NUREG-1150 program by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.« less
  • Abstract not provided.
  • A cyber security self-assessment method (the Method) has been developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The development of the Method was sponsored and directed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Members of the Nuclear Energy Institute Cyber Security Task Force also played a substantial role in developing the Method. The Method's structured approach guides nuclear power plants in scrutinizing their digital systems, assessing the potential consequences to the plant of a cyber exploitation, identifying vulnerabilities, estimating cyber security risks, and adopting cost-effective protective measures. The focus of the Method is on critical digital assets. A critical digital asset is amore » digital device or system that plays a role in the operation, maintenance, or proper functioning of a critical system (i.e., a plant system that can impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness). A critical digital asset may have a direct or indirect connection to a critical system. Direct connections include both wired and wireless communication pathways. Indirect connections include sneaker-net pathways by which software or data are manually transferred from one digital device to another. An indirect connection also may involve the use of instructions or data stored on a critical digital asset to make adjustments to a critical system. The cyber security self-assessment begins with the formation of an assessment team, and is followed by a six-stage process.« less