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Title: Structuring Cooperative Nuclear RIsk Reduction Initiatives with China.

Abstract

The Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation engaged several Chinese nuclear organizations in cooperative research that focused on responses to radiological and nuclear terrorism. The objective was to identify joint research initiatives to reduce the global dangers of such threats and to pursue initial technical collaborations in several high priority areas. Initiatives were identified in three primary research areas: 1) detection and interdiction of smuggled nuclear materials; 2) nuclear forensics; and 3) radiological (“dirty bomb”) threats and countermeasures. Initial work emphasized the application of systems and risk analysis tools, which proved effective in structuring the collaborations. The extensive engagements between national security nuclear experts in China and the U.S. during the research strengthened professional relationships between these important communities.

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. Stanford Univ., CA (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1347886
Report Number(s):
SAND-2017-2837R
651774
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Citation Formats

Brandt, Larry, Reinhardt, Jason Christian, and Hecker, Siegfried. Structuring Cooperative Nuclear RIsk Reduction Initiatives with China.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1347886.
Brandt, Larry, Reinhardt, Jason Christian, & Hecker, Siegfried. Structuring Cooperative Nuclear RIsk Reduction Initiatives with China.. United States. doi:10.2172/1347886.
Brandt, Larry, Reinhardt, Jason Christian, and Hecker, Siegfried. Wed . "Structuring Cooperative Nuclear RIsk Reduction Initiatives with China.". United States. doi:10.2172/1347886. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1347886.
@article{osti_1347886,
title = {Structuring Cooperative Nuclear RIsk Reduction Initiatives with China.},
author = {Brandt, Larry and Reinhardt, Jason Christian and Hecker, Siegfried},
abstractNote = {The Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation engaged several Chinese nuclear organizations in cooperative research that focused on responses to radiological and nuclear terrorism. The objective was to identify joint research initiatives to reduce the global dangers of such threats and to pursue initial technical collaborations in several high priority areas. Initiatives were identified in three primary research areas: 1) detection and interdiction of smuggled nuclear materials; 2) nuclear forensics; and 3) radiological (“dirty bomb”) threats and countermeasures. Initial work emphasized the application of systems and risk analysis tools, which proved effective in structuring the collaborations. The extensive engagements between national security nuclear experts in China and the U.S. during the research strengthened professional relationships between these important communities.},
doi = {10.2172/1347886},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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