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Title: Analysis of Corrosion Residues Collected from the Aluminum Basket Rails of the High-Burnup Demonstration Cask.

Abstract

On September, 2015, an inspection was performed on the TN-32B cask that will be used for the high-burnup demonstration project. During the survey, wooden cribbing that had been placed within the cask eleven years earlier to prevent shifting of the basket during transport was removed, revealing two areas of residue on the aluminum basket rails, where they had contacted the cribbing. The residue appeared to be a corrosion product, and concerns were raised that similar attack could exist at more difficult-to-inspect locations in the canister. Accordingly, when the canister was reopened, samples of the residue were collected for analysis. This report presents the results of that assessment, which determined that the corrosion was due to the presence of the cribbing. The corrosion was associated with fungal material, and fungal activity likely contributed to an aggressive chemical environment. Once the cask has been cleaned, there will be no risk of further corrosion.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE)
OSTI Identifier:
1346335
Report Number(s):
SAND2017-2306
651345
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE

Citation Formats

Bryan, Charles R. Analysis of Corrosion Residues Collected from the Aluminum Basket Rails of the High-Burnup Demonstration Cask.. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1346335.
Bryan, Charles R. Analysis of Corrosion Residues Collected from the Aluminum Basket Rails of the High-Burnup Demonstration Cask.. United States. doi:10.2172/1346335.
Bryan, Charles R. Wed . "Analysis of Corrosion Residues Collected from the Aluminum Basket Rails of the High-Burnup Demonstration Cask.". United States. doi:10.2172/1346335. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1346335.
@article{osti_1346335,
title = {Analysis of Corrosion Residues Collected from the Aluminum Basket Rails of the High-Burnup Demonstration Cask.},
author = {Bryan, Charles R.},
abstractNote = {On September, 2015, an inspection was performed on the TN-32B cask that will be used for the high-burnup demonstration project. During the survey, wooden cribbing that had been placed within the cask eleven years earlier to prevent shifting of the basket during transport was removed, revealing two areas of residue on the aluminum basket rails, where they had contacted the cribbing. The residue appeared to be a corrosion product, and concerns were raised that similar attack could exist at more difficult-to-inspect locations in the canister. Accordingly, when the canister was reopened, samples of the residue were collected for analysis. This report presents the results of that assessment, which determined that the corrosion was due to the presence of the cribbing. The corrosion was associated with fungal material, and fungal activity likely contributed to an aggressive chemical environment. Once the cask has been cleaned, there will be no risk of further corrosion.},
doi = {10.2172/1346335},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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  • Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel will be transported for processing in the 70-ton nuclear fuel element cask from L Basin to H-canyon. During transport these fuels would be expected to experience high temperature aqueous corrosion from the residual L Basin water that will be present in the cask. Cladding corrosion losses during transport were calculated for material test reactor (MTR) and high flux isotope reactors (HFIR) fuels using literature and site information on aqueous corrosion at a range of time/temperature conditions. Calculations of the cladding corrosion loss were based on Arrhenius relationships developed for aluminum alloys typical of cladding material withmore » the primary assumption that an adherent passive film does not form to retard the initial corrosion rate. For MTR fuels a cladding thickness loss of 33 % was found after 1 year in the cask with a maximum temperature of 260 {degrees}C. HFIR fuels showed a thickness loss of only 6% after 1 year at a maximum temperature of 180 {degrees}C. These losses are not expected to impact the overall confinement function of the aluminum cladding.« less
  • Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel will be transported for processing in the 70-ton nuclear fuel element cask from L Basin to H-canyon. During transport these fuels would be expected to experience high temperature aqueous corrosion from the residual L Basin water that will be present in the cask. Cladding corrosion losses during transport were calculated for material test reactor (MTR) and high flux isotope reactors (HFIR) fuels using literature and site information on aqueous corrosion at a range of time/temperature conditions. Calculations of the cladding corrosion loss were based on Arrhenius relationships developed for aluminum alloys typical of cladding material withmore » the primary assumption that an adherent passive film does not form to retard the initial corrosion rate. For MTR fuels a cladding thickness loss of 33 % was found after 1 year in the cask with a maximum temperature of 263 °C. HFIR fuels showed a thickness loss of only 6% after 1 year at a maximum temperature of 180 °C. These losses are not expected to impact the overall confinement function of the aluminum cladding.« less
  • Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel will be transported for processing in the 70-ton nuclear fuel element cask from L Basin to H-canyon. During transport these fuels would be expected to experience high temperature aqueous corrosion from the residual L Basin water that will be present in the cask. Cladding corrosion losses during transport were calculated for material test reactor (MTR) and high flux isotope reactors (HFIR) fuels using literature and site information on aqueous corrosion at a range of time/temperature conditions. Calculations of the cladding corrosion loss were based on Arrhenius relationships developed for aluminum alloys typical of cladding material withmore » the primary assumption that an adherent passive film does not form to retard the initial corrosion rate. For MTR fuels a cladding thickness loss of 33% was found after 1 year in the cask with a maximum temperature of 263 °C. HFIR fuels showed a thickness loss of only 6% after 1 year at a maximum temperature of 180 °C. These losses are not expected to impact the overall confinement function of the aluminum cladding.« less
  • The Interim Staff Guidance on bumup credit (ISG-8) for spent fuel in storage and transportation casks, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Spent Fuel Project Office, recommends a bumup measurement for each assembly to confirm the reactor record and compliance with the assembly bumup value used for loading acceptance. This recommendation is intended to prevent unauthorized loading (misloading) of assemblies due to inaccuracies in reactor burnup records and/or improper assembly identification, thereby ensuring that the appropriate subcritical margin is maintained. This report presents a computational criticality safety analysis of the consequences of misloading fuel assemblies in a highcapacity cask thatmore » relies on burnup credit for criticality safety. The purpose of this report is to provide a quantitative understanding of the effects of fuel misloading events on safety margins. A wide variety of fuel-misloading configurations are investigated and results are provided for informational purposes. This report does not address the likelihood of occurrence for any of the misload configurations considered. For representative, qualified bumup-enrichment combinations, with and without fission products included, misloading two assemblies that are underburned by 75% results in an increase in k eff of 0.025-0.045, while misloading four assemblies that are underburned by 50% also results in an increase in k eff of 0.025-0.045. For the cask and conditions considered, a reduction in bumup of 20% in all assemblies results in an increase in kff of less than 0.035. Misloading a single fresh assembly with 3, 4, or 5 wt% 235U enrichment results in an increase in k effof--0.02, 0.04, or 0.06, respectively. The report concludes with a summary of these and other important findings, as well as a discussion of relevant issues that should be considered when assessing the appropriate role of burnup measurements.« less