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Title: Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures

Abstract

systems the concrete shall not only provide shielding but insures stability of the upright canister, facilitates anchoring, allows ventilation, and provides physical protection against theft, severe weather and natural (seismic) as well as man-made events (blast incidences). Given the need to remain functional for 40 years or even longer in case of interim storage, the concrete outerpack and the internal canister components need to be evaluated with regard to their long-term ability to perform their intended design functions. Just as evidenced by deteriorating concrete bridges, there are reported visible degradation mechanisms of dry storage systems especially when high corrosive environments are considered in maritime locations. The degradation of reinforced concrete is caused by multiple physical and chemical mechanisms, which may be summarized under the heading of environmental aging. The underlying hygro-thermal transport processes are accelerated by irradiation effects, hence creep and shrinkage need to include the effect of chloride penetration, alkali aggregate reaction as well as corrosion of the reinforcing steel. In light of the above, the two main objectives of this project are to (1) develop a probabilistic multi-hazard assessment framework, and (2) through experimental and numerical research perform a comprehensive assessment under combined earthquake loads and aging inducedmore » deterioration, which will also provide data for the development and validation of the probabilistic framework.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [2];  [3]
  1. Univ. of Houston, TX (United States)
  2. Rice Univ., Houston, TX (United States)
  3. Univ. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL (United States).
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE)
OSTI Identifier:
1346144
Report Number(s):
12-3730
12-3730
DOE Contract Number:
AC07-05ID14517
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE; 42 ENGINEERING

Citation Formats

Bencturk, Bora, Padgett, Jamie, and Uddin, Rizwan. Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1346144.
Bencturk, Bora, Padgett, Jamie, & Uddin, Rizwan. Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures. United States. doi:10.2172/1346144.
Bencturk, Bora, Padgett, Jamie, and Uddin, Rizwan. Tue . "Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures". United States. doi:10.2172/1346144. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1346144.
@article{osti_1346144,
title = {Probabilistic Multi-Hazard Assessment of Dry Cask Structures},
author = {Bencturk, Bora and Padgett, Jamie and Uddin, Rizwan},
abstractNote = {systems the concrete shall not only provide shielding but insures stability of the upright canister, facilitates anchoring, allows ventilation, and provides physical protection against theft, severe weather and natural (seismic) as well as man-made events (blast incidences). Given the need to remain functional for 40 years or even longer in case of interim storage, the concrete outerpack and the internal canister components need to be evaluated with regard to their long-term ability to perform their intended design functions. Just as evidenced by deteriorating concrete bridges, there are reported visible degradation mechanisms of dry storage systems especially when high corrosive environments are considered in maritime locations. The degradation of reinforced concrete is caused by multiple physical and chemical mechanisms, which may be summarized under the heading of environmental aging. The underlying hygro-thermal transport processes are accelerated by irradiation effects, hence creep and shrinkage need to include the effect of chloride penetration, alkali aggregate reaction as well as corrosion of the reinforcing steel. In light of the above, the two main objectives of this project are to (1) develop a probabilistic multi-hazard assessment framework, and (2) through experimental and numerical research perform a comprehensive assessment under combined earthquake loads and aging induced deterioration, which will also provide data for the development and validation of the probabilistic framework.},
doi = {10.2172/1346144},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Jan 10 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Tue Jan 10 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}

Technical Report:

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  • Design of nuclear power plant (NPP) facilities to resist natural hazards has been a part of the regulatory process from the beginning of the NPP industry in the United States (US), but has evolved substantially over time. The original set of approaches and methods was entirely deterministic in nature and focused on a traditional engineering margins-based approach. However, over time probabilistic and risk-informed approaches were also developed and implemented in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidance and regulation. A defense-in-depth framework has also been incorporated into US regulatory guidance over time. As a result, today, the US regulatory framework incorporatesmore » deterministic and probabilistic approaches for a range of different applications and for a range of natural hazard considerations. This framework will continue to evolve as a result of improved knowledge and newly identified regulatory needs and objectives, most notably in response to the NRC activities developed in response to the 2011 Fukushima accident in Japan. Although the US regulatory framework has continued to evolve over time, the tools, methods and data available to the US nuclear industry to meet the changing requirements have not kept pace. Notably, there is significant room for improvement in the tools and methods available for external event probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is the principal assessment approach used in risk-informed regulations and risk-informed decision-making applied to natural hazard assessment and design. This is particularly true if PRA is applied to natural hazards other than seismic loading. Development of a new set of tools and methods that incorporate current knowledge, modern best practice, and state-of-the-art computational resources would lead to more reliable assessment of facility risk and risk insights (e.g., the SSCs and accident sequences that are most risk-significant), with less uncertainty and reduced conservatisms.« less
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