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Title: Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks

Abstract

This article submitted for publication to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists explains the possible financial incentives for financial institutions and large integrators to reduce nuclear proliferation risks by including anti-proliferation measures in their due diligence and requiring their suppliers to meet heightened compliance standards. Because manufacturers of dual-use nuclear goods are diverse and numerous outreach is difficult. However, financial institutions and large integrators work with nearly all dual-use manufacturers, making financial institutions and integrators well-positioned to increase awareness of proliferation and trafficking risks throughout the nuclear supply chain

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1334862
Report Number(s):
PNNL-SA-115224
Journal ID: ISSN 0096-3402; DN4004030
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Journal Volume: 72; Journal Issue: 5
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
nuclear; nonproliferation; anti-proliferation; financial institutions; integrators; self-regulation; illicit trafficking; dual-use; dual-use goods; due diligence; supply chain; supply chain security

Citation Formats

Weise, Rachel A., and Hund, Gretchen. Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks. United States: N. p., 2016. Web. doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1216676.
Weise, Rachel A., & Hund, Gretchen. Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks. United States. doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1216676.
Weise, Rachel A., and Hund, Gretchen. Mon . "Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks". United States. doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1216676.
@article{osti_1334862,
title = {Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks},
author = {Weise, Rachel A. and Hund, Gretchen},
abstractNote = {This article submitted for publication to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists explains the possible financial incentives for financial institutions and large integrators to reduce nuclear proliferation risks by including anti-proliferation measures in their due diligence and requiring their suppliers to meet heightened compliance standards. Because manufacturers of dual-use nuclear goods are diverse and numerous outreach is difficult. However, financial institutions and large integrators work with nearly all dual-use manufacturers, making financial institutions and integrators well-positioned to increase awareness of proliferation and trafficking risks throughout the nuclear supply chain},
doi = {10.1080/00963402.2016.1216676},
journal = {Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists},
number = 5,
volume = 72,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Aug 15 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Mon Aug 15 00:00:00 EDT 2016}
}
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