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Title: Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems

Abstract

While there has been a great deal of security research focused on preventing attacks, there has been less work on how one should balance security and resilience investments. In this work we developed and evaluated models that captured both explicit defenses and other mitigations that reduce the impact of attacks. We examined these issues both in more broadly applicable general Stackelberg models and in more specific network and power grid settings. Finally, we compared these solutions to existing work in terms of both solution quality and computational overhead.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1330190
Report Number(s):
SAND2016-9871
648141
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Citation Formats

Letchford, Joshua. Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems. United States: N. p., 2016. Web. doi:10.2172/1330190.
Letchford, Joshua. Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems. United States. doi:10.2172/1330190.
Letchford, Joshua. Thu . "Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems". United States. doi:10.2172/1330190. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1330190.
@article{osti_1330190,
title = {Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems},
author = {Letchford, Joshua},
abstractNote = {While there has been a great deal of security research focused on preventing attacks, there has been less work on how one should balance security and resilience investments. In this work we developed and evaluated models that captured both explicit defenses and other mitigations that reduce the impact of attacks. We examined these issues both in more broadly applicable general Stackelberg models and in more specific network and power grid settings. Finally, we compared these solutions to existing work in terms of both solution quality and computational overhead.},
doi = {10.2172/1330190},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Thu Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016}
}

Technical Report:

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