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Title: Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems

Abstract

While demand response programs implement energy efficiency and power quality objectives, they bring potential security threats to the Smart Grid. The ability to influence load in a system enables attackers to cause system failures and impacts the quality and integrity of power delivered to customers. This paper presents a security mechanism to monitor and control load according to a set of security policies during normal system operation. The mechanism monitors, detects, and responds to load altering attacks. We examined the security requirements of Smart Grid stakeholders and constructed a set of load control policies enforced by the mechanism. We implemented a proof of concept prototype and tested it using the simulation environment. By enforcing the proposed policies in this prototype, the system is maintained in a safe state in the presence of load drop attacks.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
City of Los Angeles Department
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)
OSTI Identifier:
1326235
Report Number(s):
DOE-USC-00192-131
DOE Contract Number:
OE0000192
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: in Proceedings of the 2015 Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (MSCPES) (IEEE), Seattle, April 2015.; Conference: 2015 Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems Seattle, WA Apr-15
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Ryutov, Tatyana, AlMajali, Anas, and Neuman, Clifford. Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems. United States: N. p., 2015. Web. doi:10.1109/MSCPES.2015.7115393.
Ryutov, Tatyana, AlMajali, Anas, & Neuman, Clifford. Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems. United States. doi:10.1109/MSCPES.2015.7115393.
Ryutov, Tatyana, AlMajali, Anas, and Neuman, Clifford. Wed . "Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems". United States. doi:10.1109/MSCPES.2015.7115393. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1326235.
@article{osti_1326235,
title = {Security Policies for Mitigating the Risk of Load Altering Attacks on Smart Grid Systems},
author = {Ryutov, Tatyana and AlMajali, Anas and Neuman, Clifford},
abstractNote = {While demand response programs implement energy efficiency and power quality objectives, they bring potential security threats to the Smart Grid. The ability to influence load in a system enables attackers to cause system failures and impacts the quality and integrity of power delivered to customers. This paper presents a security mechanism to monitor and control load according to a set of security policies during normal system operation. The mechanism monitors, detects, and responds to load altering attacks. We examined the security requirements of Smart Grid stakeholders and constructed a set of load control policies enforced by the mechanism. We implemented a proof of concept prototype and tested it using the simulation environment. By enforcing the proposed policies in this prototype, the system is maintained in a safe state in the presence of load drop attacks.},
doi = {10.1109/MSCPES.2015.7115393},
journal = {in Proceedings of the 2015 Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (MSCPES) (IEEE), Seattle, April 2015.},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Apr 01 00:00:00 EDT 2015},
month = {Wed Apr 01 00:00:00 EDT 2015}
}

Conference:
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