skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources

Abstract

Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. It has recently been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication (LOCC) adversaries. Here in this paper, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser sources and linear optics. Lastly, in this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss.

Authors:
 [1];  [2];  [3];  [4];  [1];  [5]
  1. Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Computational Sciences and Engineering Division
  2. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States). Research Lab. of Electronics
  3. Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN (United States). Dept. of Physics and Astronomy
  4. Southern Illinois Univ., Carbonadale, IL (United States)
  5. Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Computational Sciences and Engineering Division; Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN (United States). Dept. of Physics and Astronomy
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
US Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research (ONR); Work for Others (WFO); USDOE Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program
OSTI Identifier:
1325473
Alternate Identifier(s):
OSTI ID: 1324497
Grant/Contract Number:  
AC05-00OR22725; M614000329
Resource Type:
Journal Article: Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Physical Review A
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 94; Journal Issue: 3; Journal ID: ISSN 2469-9926
Publisher:
American Physical Society (APS)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION

Citation Formats

Lim, Charles Ci Wen, Xu, Feihu, Siopsis, George, Chitambar, Eric, Evans, Philip G., and Qi, Bing. Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources. United States: N. p., 2016. Web. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.94.032315.
Lim, Charles Ci Wen, Xu, Feihu, Siopsis, George, Chitambar, Eric, Evans, Philip G., & Qi, Bing. Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources. United States. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.94.032315.
Lim, Charles Ci Wen, Xu, Feihu, Siopsis, George, Chitambar, Eric, Evans, Philip G., and Qi, Bing. Wed . "Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources". United States. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.94.032315. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1325473.
@article{osti_1325473,
title = {Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources},
author = {Lim, Charles Ci Wen and Xu, Feihu and Siopsis, George and Chitambar, Eric and Evans, Philip G. and Qi, Bing},
abstractNote = {Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. It has recently been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication (LOCC) adversaries. Here in this paper, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser sources and linear optics. Lastly, in this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss.},
doi = {10.1103/PhysRevA.94.032315},
journal = {Physical Review A},
number = 3,
volume = 94,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Sep 14 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Wed Sep 14 00:00:00 EDT 2016}
}

Journal Article:
Free Publicly Available Full Text
Publisher's Version of Record

Citation Metrics:
Cited by: 1 work
Citation information provided by
Web of Science

Save / Share: