skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Review of the U.S.-U.K. Warhead Monitored Dismantlement Exercise

 [1];  [2]
  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory
  2. UK Ministry of Defence
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)
OSTI Identifier:
Report Number(s):
DOE Contract Number:
Resource Type:
Resource Relation:
Conference: 57th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management ; 2016-07-24 - 2016-07-28 ; Atlanta, Georgia, United States
Country of Publication:
United States
Treaty Verification, WMD, Warhead Monitored Dismantlement

Citation Formats

Hauck, Danielle Kristin, and Russell, Iain. Review of the U.S.-U.K. Warhead Monitored Dismantlement Exercise. United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Hauck, Danielle Kristin, & Russell, Iain. Review of the U.S.-U.K. Warhead Monitored Dismantlement Exercise. United States.
Hauck, Danielle Kristin, and Russell, Iain. Thu . "Review of the U.S.-U.K. Warhead Monitored Dismantlement Exercise". United States. doi:.
title = {Review of the U.S.-U.K. Warhead Monitored Dismantlement Exercise},
author = {Hauck, Danielle Kristin and Russell, Iain},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Aug 04 00:00:00 EDT 2016},
month = {Thu Aug 04 00:00:00 EDT 2016}

Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that hold this conference proceeding.

Save / Share:
  • Over the past 10 years, US and UK experts have engaged in a technical collaboration with the aim of improving scientific and technological abilities in support of potential future nuclear arms control and non-proliferation agreements. In 2011 a monitored dismantlement exercise provided an opportunity to develop and test potential monitoring technologies and approaches. The exercise followed a simulated nuclear object through a dismantlement process and looked to explore, with a level of realism, issues surrounding device and material monitoring, chain of custody, authentication and certification of equipment, data management and managed access. This paper focuses on the development and deploymentmore » of the ‘room-within-a-room’ system, which was designed to maintain chain of custody during disassembly operations. A key challenge for any verification regime operating within a nuclear weapon complex is to provide the monitoring party with the opportunity to gather sufficient evidence, whilst protecting sensitive or proliferative information held by the host. The requirement to address both monitoring and host party concerns led to a dual function design which: • Created a controlled boundary around the disassembly process area which could provide evidence of unauthorised diversion activities. • Shielded sensitive disassembly operations from monitoring party observation. The deployed room-within-a-room was an integrated system which combined a number of chain of custody technologies (i.e. cameras, tamper indicating panels and enclosures, seals, unique identifiers and radiation portals) and supporting deployment procedures. This paper discusses the bounding aims and constraints identified by the monitoring and host parties with respect to the disassembly phase, the design of the room-within-a-room system, lessons learned during deployment, conclusions and potential areas of future work. Overall it was agreed that the room-within-a-room approach was effective but the individual technologies used to create the system deployed during this exercise required further development.« less
  • The goal of the US Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI) initiative is the development of a series of transparency measures that provide confidence that nuclear warheads are actually being dismantled and that the fissile material being removed from these dismantled weapons is not recycled into new production. A limited chain of custody (LCC) would follow a warhead from the time it is declared excess until it is actually dismantled and the fissile materials are stored. Measurement of warhead signatures is an option in LCC using radiation detection techniques to confirm that a warhead has been dismantled, without intrusive inspections withinmore » the dismantlement facility. This paper discusses LCC and warhead signatures as well as indicate first results of laboratory measurements related to warhead signatures.« less
  • Future arms control treaties may provide for dismantlement of warheads and/or controls on nuclear material. Choosing procedures and technologies for verifying compliance with such provisions requires trading-off the relative benefits and costs of the alternatives. One of the most important costs is the risk of disclosure of sensitive national security information. We present a risk analysis approach that has been developed to assess the relative risks of different verification measures, including many that are routinely used in nuclear materials safeguards. The five step methodology incorporates the relative probabilities of disclosure, the quality of the information in the disclosures, and themore » relative impacts of the disclosures for national security. These components of risk are then combined in a relative risk index, which can be used to choose among competing alternatives. We explain the methodology and highlight key assumptions. Key issues in implementing the approach are discussed, as are the most important factors in structuring the analysis and in assessing the relevant parameters.« less
  • No abstract prepared.