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Title: Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution: Security analysis and fast implementation

Abstract

One of the most pressing issues in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the problem of detector side-channel attacks. To overcome this problem, researchers proposed an elegant “time-reversal” QKD protocol called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), which is based on time-reversed entanglement swapping. But, MDI-QKD is more challenging to implement than standard point-to-point QKD. Recently, we proposed an intermediary QKD protocol called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD) in order to overcome the drawbacks of MDI-QKD, with the hope that it would eventually lead to a more efficient detector side-channel-free QKD system. We analyze the security of DDI-QKD and elucidate its security assumptions. We find that DDI-QKD is not equivalent to MDI-QKD, but its security can be demonstrated with reasonable assumptions. On the more practical side, we consider the feasibility of DDI-QKD and present a fast experimental demonstration (clocked at 625 MHz), capable of secret key exchange up to more than 90 km.

Authors:
 [1]; ORCiD logo [1];  [2];  [1];  [3];  [1];  [1]
  1. Univ. of Geneva (Switzerland)
  2. Univ. of Geneva (Switzerland); ID Quantique, SA, Carouge, Geneva (Swizterland)
  3. Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1295142
Grant/Contract Number:
AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Journal Article: Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
Journal of Applied Physics
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 120; Journal Issue: 6; Journal ID: ISSN 0021-8979
Publisher:
American Institute of Physics (AIP)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION

Citation Formats

Boaron, Alberto, Korzh, Boris, Houlmann, Raphael, Boso, Gianluca, Lim, Charles Ci Wen, Martin, Anthony, and Zbinden, Hugo. Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution: Security analysis and fast implementation. United States: N. p., 2016. Web. doi:10.1063/1.4960093.
Boaron, Alberto, Korzh, Boris, Houlmann, Raphael, Boso, Gianluca, Lim, Charles Ci Wen, Martin, Anthony, & Zbinden, Hugo. Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution: Security analysis and fast implementation. United States. doi:10.1063/1.4960093.
Boaron, Alberto, Korzh, Boris, Houlmann, Raphael, Boso, Gianluca, Lim, Charles Ci Wen, Martin, Anthony, and Zbinden, Hugo. 2016. "Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution: Security analysis and fast implementation". United States. doi:10.1063/1.4960093. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1295142.
@article{osti_1295142,
title = {Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution: Security analysis and fast implementation},
author = {Boaron, Alberto and Korzh, Boris and Houlmann, Raphael and Boso, Gianluca and Lim, Charles Ci Wen and Martin, Anthony and Zbinden, Hugo},
abstractNote = {One of the most pressing issues in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the problem of detector side-channel attacks. To overcome this problem, researchers proposed an elegant “time-reversal” QKD protocol called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), which is based on time-reversed entanglement swapping. But, MDI-QKD is more challenging to implement than standard point-to-point QKD. Recently, we proposed an intermediary QKD protocol called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD) in order to overcome the drawbacks of MDI-QKD, with the hope that it would eventually lead to a more efficient detector side-channel-free QKD system. We analyze the security of DDI-QKD and elucidate its security assumptions. We find that DDI-QKD is not equivalent to MDI-QKD, but its security can be demonstrated with reasonable assumptions. On the more practical side, we consider the feasibility of DDI-QKD and present a fast experimental demonstration (clocked at 625 MHz), capable of secret key exchange up to more than 90 km.},
doi = {10.1063/1.4960093},
journal = {Journal of Applied Physics},
number = 6,
volume = 120,
place = {United States},
year = 2016,
month = 8
}

Journal Article:
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  • One of the most pressing issues in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the problem of detector side-channel attacks. To overcome this problem, researchers proposed an elegant “time-reversal” QKD protocol called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), which is based on time-reversed entanglement swapping. However, MDI-QKD is more challenging to implement than standard point-to-point QKD. Recently, an intermediary QKD protocol called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD) has been proposed to overcome the drawbacks of MDI-QKD, with the hope that it would eventually lead to a more efficient detector side-channel-free QKD system. Here, we analyze the security of DDI-QKD and elucidate its security assumptions. We find thatmore » DDI-QKD is not equivalent to MDI-QKD, but its security can be demonstrated with reasonable assumptions. On the more practical side, we consider the feasibility of DDI-QKD and present a fast experimental demonstration (clocked at 625 MHz), capable of secret key exchange up to more than 90 km.« less
  • By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced to being ''device-independent.'' Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established for one-way (prepare and measure) QKD. While fully device-independent security is impossible, we show that security can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent scenario. In the latter, the devices used by the trusted parties are noncharacterized, but the dimensionality of the quantum systems used in the protocol is assumed to be bounded. Our security proof relies on the analogies between one-way QKD, dimension witnesses, and random-access codes.
  • Recently, a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme based on entanglement swapping, called measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD), was proposed to bypass all measurement side-channel attacks. While mdiQKD is conceptually elegant and offers a supreme level of security, the experimental complexity is challenging for practical systems. For instance, it requires interference between two widely separated independent single-photon sources, and the secret key rates are dependent on detecting two photons—one from each source. Here, we demonstrate a proof-of-principle experiment of a QKD scheme that removes the need for a two-photon system and instead uses the idea of a two-qubit single-photon to significantly simplify themore » implementation and improve the efficiency of mdiQKD in several aspects.« less