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Title: INMM PAPER ON "MAPPING AND EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR MAINTAINING CHAIN OF CUSTODY DURING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS MONITORED DISMANTLEMENT"

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
SRS
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1281770
Report Number(s):
SRNL-L4500-2016-00092
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC09-08SR22470
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 2016 INMM Annual Meeting
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Krementz, D. INMM PAPER ON "MAPPING AND EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR MAINTAINING CHAIN OF CUSTODY DURING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS MONITORED DISMANTLEMENT". United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Krementz, D. INMM PAPER ON "MAPPING AND EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR MAINTAINING CHAIN OF CUSTODY DURING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS MONITORED DISMANTLEMENT". United States.
Krementz, D. 2016. "INMM PAPER ON "MAPPING AND EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR MAINTAINING CHAIN OF CUSTODY DURING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS MONITORED DISMANTLEMENT"". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1281770.
@article{osti_1281770,
title = {INMM PAPER ON "MAPPING AND EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR MAINTAINING CHAIN OF CUSTODY DURING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS MONITORED DISMANTLEMENT"},
author = {Krementz, D.},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2016,
month = 7
}

Conference:
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  • The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components andmore » fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.« less
  • The goal of the US Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI) initiative is the development of a series of transparency measures that provide confidence that nuclear warheads are actually being dismantled and that the fissile material being removed from these dismantled weapons is not recycled into new production. A limited chain of custody (LCC) would follow a warhead from the time it is declared excess until it is actually dismantled and the fissile materials are stored. Measurement of warhead signatures is an option in LCC using radiation detection techniques to confirm that a warhead has been dismantled, without intrusive inspections withinmore » the dismantlement facility. This paper discusses LCC and warhead signatures as well as indicate first results of laboratory measurements related to warhead signatures.« less
  • Abstract not provided.
  • Abstract not provided.
  • We review here results of several classes of US nuclear weapons tests conducted within the past decade, together with the principal strengths and weaknesses of nuclear weapons themselves. It is found that a high degree of confidence in the reliability of the existing stockpile is justified, and that it is sufficiently robust to permit confidence in the reliability of remanufactured warheads in the absence of nuclear explosive proof-tests. We also review problems encountered with the 14 nuclear weapon designs since 1958 that have been frequently and prominently cited as evidence that a Low-Threshold Test Ban (LTTB) or a Comprehensive Testmore » Ban (CTB) would preclude the possibility of maintaining a reliable stockpile. It is concluded that the experience has little if any relevance to the question of maintaining the reliability of the stockpile of nuclear weapons that exists in 1987. It is recommended that the Department of Energy be encouraged to undertake the formulation and execution of a Readiness Program whose purpose is to ensure that the US is prepared to maintain the reliability of its stockpile of nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear explosive tests, and that funds earmarked for this purpose be provided.« less