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Title: Chemical Weapons: Terminology Technology Treaties and Verification Techniques.


Abstract not provided.

Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
Report Number(s):
DOE Contract Number:
Resource Type:
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the Regional Workshop on Disaster Management held March 4-8, 2007 in Amman, Jordan.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Horak, Karl Emanuel. Chemical Weapons: Terminology Technology Treaties and Verification Techniques.. United States: N. p., 2007. Web.
Horak, Karl Emanuel. Chemical Weapons: Terminology Technology Treaties and Verification Techniques.. United States.
Horak, Karl Emanuel. Thu . "Chemical Weapons: Terminology Technology Treaties and Verification Techniques.". United States. doi:.
title = {Chemical Weapons: Terminology Technology Treaties and Verification Techniques.},
author = {Horak, Karl Emanuel},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Thu Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2007}

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  • The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced bymore » the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.« less
  • The U.S. Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, announced by President Clinton before the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, commits the U.S. to placing under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards excess nuclear materials no longer needed for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. As of July 1, 1995, the IAEA had completed Initial Physical Inventory Verification (IPIV) at two facilities: a storage vault in the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant containing highly enriched uranium (HOW) metal and another storage vault in the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) containing plutonium oxide and plutonium-bearing residues. Another plutonium- storage vault, located at Rockymore » Flats, is scheduled for the IPIV in the fall of 1995. Conventional neutron coincidence counting is one of the routinely applied IAEA nondestructive assay (ND) methods for verification of uranium and plutonium. However, at all three facilities mentioned above, neutron ND equipment had to be modified or developed for specific facility needs such as the type and configuration of material placed under safeguards. This document describes those modifications and developments.« less
  • The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to providemore » confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information.« less
  • The United States has signed and become a party to more than 30 multilateral and bilateral arms control agreements since 1959. The lack of absolute effectiveness and confidence of these agreements to limit or ban WMD arsenals or to prevent WMD proliferation has caused many learned arms control scholars to question America`s use of these treaties to meet national security objectives. The controversy often focuses on verification of a treaty member`s compliance with the terms of the agreement. However, what seems to be a poor record of treaty compliance and adequate verification is in reality, a moderate success in stemmingmore » WMD proliferation and is indicative of the continuing evolution of compliance verification as the central factor in evaluating treaty effectiveness. The thesis of this study is that verification of treaty compliance has also evolved as the most important component of arms control, and the U.S. must remained engaged as the world leader to strengthen WMD treaties with verification procedures that provide a high probability of detection and deterrence to potential violators.« less
  • The large neutron multiplicity counter (LNMC), also known as the 30-gal.-drum neutron multiplicity counter, has now been used successfully by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Initial Physical Inventory Verification (IPIV) and the first annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) of excess weapons plutonium oxide at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). These excess plutonium oxide materials contain a variety of impurities. They are stored two cans to a 10-gal.-drum. The drums contain from 1.3 to 4.0 kg of plutonium. The isotopic declarations vary from can to can but the material averages 6% {sup 240}Pu. During the IPIV,more » 94 samples were measured in the LNMC; 19 were measured during the PIV. The assays for all but a single drum agreed to within three standard deviations of the declared value. This problematic drum could not be measured by the LNMC because of its unusually high neutron emission rate. In this paper we will report on the overall performance of the LNMC in these inspections.« less