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Title: Using Commercial Electronics in Nuclear Detection

  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)
OSTI Identifier:
Report Number(s):
DOE Contract Number:
Resource Type:
Resource Relation:
Conference: Commercial Electronics in Reliable Spacecraft Meeting ; 2016-06-22 - 2016-06-22 ; Pasadena, California, United States
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Quinn, Heather Marie. Using Commercial Electronics in Nuclear Detection. United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Quinn, Heather Marie. Using Commercial Electronics in Nuclear Detection. United States.
Quinn, Heather Marie. 2016. "Using Commercial Electronics in Nuclear Detection". United States. doi:.
title = {Using Commercial Electronics in Nuclear Detection},
author = {Quinn, Heather Marie},
abstractNote = {},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2016,
month = 6

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