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Title: Arms Control Verification Careers.


Abstract not provided.

Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
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Report Number(s):
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Conference: Proposed for presentation at the 2015 SACNAS National Conference held October 29-31, 2015 in Washington DC.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Sadler, Lorraine E. Arms Control Verification Careers.. United States: N. p., 2015. Web.
Sadler, Lorraine E. Arms Control Verification Careers.. United States.
Sadler, Lorraine E. 2015. "Arms Control Verification Careers.". United States. doi:.
title = {Arms Control Verification Careers.},
author = {Sadler, Lorraine E.},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2015,
month = 4

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  • The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the keymore » points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.« less
  • Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) present some particularly striking problems for both national security and arms control. These small, dual-purpose, difficult to detect weapons present some formidable challenges for verification in any scheme that attempts to limit rather than eliminate them. Conventionally armed SLCMs offer to the navies of both superpowers important offensive and defensive capabilities. Nuclear armed, long-range, land-attack SLCMs, on the other hand, seem to pose destabilizing threats and otherwise have questionable value, despite strong US support for extensive deployment of them. If these weapons are not constrained, their deployment could circumvent gains which might be made in agreementsmore » directly reducing of strategic nuclear weapons. This paper reviews the technology and planned deployments of SLCMs, the verification schemes which have been discussed and are being investigated to try to deal with the problem, and examines the proposed need for and possible uses of SLCMs. It presents an overview of the problem technically, militarily, and politically.« less
  • This paper reports on new developments in hodoscope radiation detection technology which offer a wide range of unique capabilities for arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications. Originally developed for civilian nuclear power research by Argonne National Laboratory, this concept uses an array of radiation detectors to image or detect objects inside opaque containments. Hodoscope systems may detect neutrons and/or gamma-rays. The systems may be based on transmission of radiation through the objects, may detect radiation stimulated in the objects, or may detect intrinsic object radiation. ACTV hodoscopes do not require the high-speed data acquisition systems or the heavy shielding andmore » collimation of reactor hodoscopes, and relatively weak radiation sources are sufficient. The authors have performed laboratory measurements to demonstrate a range of potential applications. Gamma-ray transmission hodoscopes can be used to inspect canisters, rail cars, etc. to monitor objects such as rocket motors.« less
  • The first Defense Nuclear Agency Conference on Arms Control and Verification Technology provided an international forum for over 200 individuals from the arms control verification technology and national security communities for discussion on the future of arms control verification and technology developments. Papers were presented in the following sessions: Future Arms Control Initiatives, Interface between Intelligence and Arms Control, Lessons Learned, Proliferation in a Changing World Technologies -- Roles and Applications, and Economics of Arms Control. Plenary sessions for general presentations on the future role of verification technology and negotiating and implementing verification measures. The conference papers will be publishedmore » separately.« less