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Title: Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures

Abstract

This brief describes a strategy that, when implemented, will allow the attributes, i.e., the physical properties, of nuclear weapon and other configurations of fissile material to be estimated from Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) signatures for arms control, treaty verification, and transparency purposes. Attributes are estimated by condensing measured NMIS signatures into ''features'' that approximately represent physical characteristics of the measurement such as gamma-ray transmission, induced fission, etc. The features are obtained from NMIS signatures to estimate quantities related to gamma and neutron transmission through the inspected item and gamma and neutron scattering and production via induced fission within the inspected item. Multivariate, i.e., multiple-feature, linear models have been successfully employed to estimate attributes, and multivariate nonlinear models are currently under investigation. Attributes estimated employing this strategy can then be examined to test the supposition that the inspected item is in fact a nuclear weapon.

Authors:
; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, TN (US)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Defense Programs (DP) (US)
OSTI Identifier:
12462
Report Number(s):
YLB-16,015,R1
TRN: US0102525
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-84OR21400
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 24 Aug 1999
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; ARMS CONTROL; FISSILE MATERIALS; IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PHYSICAL PROPERTIES; SCATTERING; VERIFICATION; TREATIES; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; PATTERN RECOGNITION; GAMMA DETECTION; NEUTRON DETECTION

Citation Formats

mattingly, j.k., mihalczo, j.t., mullens, j.a., perez, r.b., and valentine, t.e.. Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures. United States: N. p., 1999. Web. doi:10.2172/12462.
mattingly, j.k., mihalczo, j.t., mullens, j.a., perez, r.b., & valentine, t.e.. Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures. United States. doi:10.2172/12462.
mattingly, j.k., mihalczo, j.t., mullens, j.a., perez, r.b., and valentine, t.e.. Tue . "Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures". United States. doi:10.2172/12462. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/12462.
@article{osti_12462,
title = {Estimating Attributes of Nuclear Weapon and Other Fissile Material Configuration Using Features Of Nuclear Materials Identification Signatures},
author = {mattingly, j.k. and mihalczo, j.t. and mullens, j.a. and perez, r.b. and valentine, t.e.},
abstractNote = {This brief describes a strategy that, when implemented, will allow the attributes, i.e., the physical properties, of nuclear weapon and other configurations of fissile material to be estimated from Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) signatures for arms control, treaty verification, and transparency purposes. Attributes are estimated by condensing measured NMIS signatures into ''features'' that approximately represent physical characteristics of the measurement such as gamma-ray transmission, induced fission, etc. The features are obtained from NMIS signatures to estimate quantities related to gamma and neutron transmission through the inspected item and gamma and neutron scattering and production via induced fission within the inspected item. Multivariate, i.e., multiple-feature, linear models have been successfully employed to estimate attributes, and multivariate nonlinear models are currently under investigation. Attributes estimated employing this strategy can then be examined to test the supposition that the inspected item is in fact a nuclear weapon.},
doi = {10.2172/12462},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Aug 24 00:00:00 EDT 1999},
month = {Tue Aug 24 00:00:00 EDT 1999}
}

Technical Report:

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