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Title: Information Barriers for Imaging.


Abstract not provided.

; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)
OSTI Identifier:
Report Number(s):
DOE Contract Number:
Resource Type:
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the WMS review meeting held March 17-19, 2015 in Livermore, CA.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Brubaker, Erik, Chris MacGahan, Matthew Kupinski, Hilton, Nathan R., and Johnson, William C. Information Barriers for Imaging.. United States: N. p., 2015. Web.
Brubaker, Erik, Chris MacGahan, Matthew Kupinski, Hilton, Nathan R., & Johnson, William C. Information Barriers for Imaging.. United States.
Brubaker, Erik, Chris MacGahan, Matthew Kupinski, Hilton, Nathan R., and Johnson, William C. 2015. "Information Barriers for Imaging.". United States. doi:.
title = {Information Barriers for Imaging.},
author = {Brubaker, Erik and Chris MacGahan and Matthew Kupinski and Hilton, Nathan R. and Johnson, William C},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2015,
month = 3

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  • Abstract not provided.
  • This paper discusses the detailed requirements for an information barrier (IB) for use with verification systems that employ intrusive measurement technologies. The IB would protect classified information in a bilateral or multilateral inspection of classified fissile material. Such a barrier must strike a balance between providing the inspecting party the confidence necessary to accept the measurement while protecting the inspected party`s classified information. The authors discuss the structure required of an IB as well as the implications of the IB on detector system maintenance. A defense-in-depth approach is proposed which would provide assurance to the inspected party that all sensitivemore » information is protected and to the inspecting party that the measurements are being performed as expected. The barrier could include elements of physical protection (such as locks, surveillance systems, and tamper indicators), hardening of key hardware components, assurance of capabilities and limitations of hardware and software systems, administrative controls, validation and verification of the systems, and error detection and resolution. Finally, an unclassified interface could be used to display and, possibly, record measurement results. The introduction of an IB into an analysis system may result in many otherwise innocuous components (detectors, analyzers, etc.) becoming classified and unavailable for routine maintenance by uncleared personnel. System maintenance and updating will be significantly simplified if the classification status of as many components as possible can be made reversible (i.e. the component can become unclassified following the removal of classified objects).« less
  • The concept ''transparency'' was introduced into the safeguards lexicon in the early 1990s, and the term ''information barrier'' was introduced into the safeguards lexicon in the late 1990s. Although the terms might have been new, the concepts were not. Both concepts have been used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its inspectors since the early 1980s, but the terms ''transparency'' and ''information barrier'' were not used for those concepts then. The definitions of these concepts have evolved in recent years, and these concepts have been applied to a broader category of special nuclear material measurement problems. The originmore » and features of the information barrier concept will be traced from an early implementation by the IAEA to the current state-of-the-art information barrier technology used in nonproliferation, arms control, and dismantlement.« less
  • Negotiations between technical representatives of the US and the Russian Federation in support of several pending nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements must take account of the need for assurances against the release of sensitive information. Most of these agreements involve storing nuclear material and in some cases nuclear components from stockpile weapons in specially designed containers. Strategies for monitoring the agreements typically include measuring neutron and gamma radiation from the controlled items to verify declared attributes of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will contain information about the design of themore » component being monitored, information considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. Safeguards have evolved to prevent disclosure of this information during inspections. These measures combine hardware, software, and procedural measures to contain the sensitive data, presenting only the results needed for verification. Custom features preserve data security and guard against disclosure in case of failure. This paper summarizes the general problem and discusses currently developing solutions for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It argues for the simplest possible implementation of several key system components.« less