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Title: Lessons Learned & Observations on the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise


Abstract not provided.

  1. Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
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Research Org.:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
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Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Kreek, S. A.. Lessons Learned & Observations on the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise. United States: N. p., 2015. Web. doi:10.2172/1179429.
Kreek, S. A.. Lessons Learned & Observations on the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise. United States. doi:10.2172/1179429.
Kreek, S. A.. 2015. "Lessons Learned & Observations on the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise". United States. doi:10.2172/1179429.
title = {Lessons Learned & Observations on the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise},
author = {Kreek, S. A.},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {10.2172/1179429},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2015,
month = 1

Technical Report:

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  • In a September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton announced a new nonproliferation and export control policy that established a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new policy proposed that the US undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material. One of the key elements was for the US to support a special nuclear materials (SNM) multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. This policy is often referred to as themore » President`s Cutoff Initiative or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Because both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and foreign reprocessing facilities similar to PUREX will likely to be inspected under a FMCT, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Negotiations and Analysis Division (DOE/NN-41) tasked Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform an information gathering exercise, the PUREX Exercise, using the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant located on the Hanford Site in Washington State. PUREX is a former production reactor fuel reprocessing plant currently undergoing a transition to a ``decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) ready`` mode. The PUREX Exercise was conducted March 29--30, 1994, to examine aspects of the imposition of several possible cutoff regimes and to study verification of non-production of SNM for nuclear weapons purposes or outside of safeguards. A follow-up activity to further examine various additional verification regimes was held at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on May 10, 1994.« less
  • On August 28 and September 18, 1990, Gulf States Utilities, the States of Louisiana and Mississippi, five local parishes, six Federal agencies, and the American Nuclear Insurers participated in a post-emergency TABLETOP exercise in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The purpose of the exercise was to examine the post-emergency roles, responsibilities, and resources of utility, State, local, Federal and insurance organizations in response to a hypothetical accident at the River Bend Station in Louisiana resulting in a significant release of radiation to the environment. In pursuit of this goal, five major focus areas were addressed: (1) ingestion pathway response; (2) reentry, relocationmore » and return; (3) decontamination of recovery; (4) indemnification of financial losses; and (5) deactivation of the emergency response. This report documents the lessons learned from that exercise.« less
  • A U.S./Russian Federation Joint Tabletop Exercise took place in Snezhinsk, Russia, from 19 to 24 October 1998 whose objectives were to examine the functioning of an Inspection Team (IT) in a given scenario, to evaluate the strategies and techniques employed by the IT, to identify ambiguous interpretations of treaty provisions that needed clarification, and to confirm the overall utility of tabletop exercises to assist in developing an effective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime. To achieve these objectives, the United States and Russian Federation (RF) agreed that two exercises would be conducted. The first would be developed by themore » RF, who would act as controller and as the inspected State Party (ISP), while the United States would play the role of the IT. The roles would be reversed in the second exercise; the United States would develop the scenario and play the ISP, while the RF would play the IT. A joint control team, comprised of members of both the U.S. and RF control teams, agreed on a number of ground rules for the two exercises and established a joint Evaluation Team to evaluate both of the exercises against the stated objectives. To meet time limitations, the scope of this joint exercise needed to be limited. The joint control team decided that each of the two exercises would not go beyond the first 25 days of an on-site inspection (OSI) and that the focus would be on examining the decision-making of the IT as it utilized the various technologies to clarify whether a nuclear test explosion had taken place. Hence, issues such as logistics, restricted access, and activities prior to Point of Entry (POE) would be played only to the extent needed to provide for a realistic context for the exercises' focus on inspection procedures, sensor deployments, and data interpretation. Each of the exercises began at the POE and proceeded with several iterations of negotiations between the IT and ISP, instrument deployments, and data evaluation by the IT. By the end of each of the exercises, each IT had located the site of the underground nuclear explosion (UNE). While this validated the methods employed by each of the ITS, the Evaluation Team noted that each IT employed different search strategies and that each strategy had both advantages and disadvantages. The exercises also highlighted ambiguities in interpretation of certain treaty provisions related to overflights and seismic monitoring. Likewise, a substantial number of lessons were learned relating to radionuclide monitoring and the impact of logistical constraints on successful OSI execution. These lessons are discussed more fully in the body of this report. Notwithstanding the overall positive assessment by the U.S. and RF participants, as well as by the Evaluation Team, that the exercise had met its objectives, there were a variety of areas identified that could be improved in subsequent OSI exercises. Some of these included reexamination of the methods used to convey visual observation data in an exercise; the amount of time compression employed; and the need for better verification of agreements pertaining to the structure, format, and other rules of the exercise. This report summarizes the lessons learned pertaining to both the technical and operational aspects of an OSI as well as to those pertaining to the planning and execution of an OSI exercise. It concludes with comments from the Evaluation Team and proposed next steps for future U.S./RF interactions on CTBT OSIs.« less
  • A U.S./Russian Federation Joint Tabletop Exercise took place in Snezhinsk, Russia, from 19 to 24 October 1998, whose objectives were the following: (1) To simulate the actions of the Inspection Team (IT), including interactions with the inspected State Party (ISP), in order to examine different ways the United States and Russian Federation (RF) approach inspections and develop appropriate recommendations for the international community. (2) To identify ambiguities and contradictions in the interpretation of Treaty and Protocol provisions that might become apparent in the course of an inspection and that need clarification in connection with the development of Operational Manuals andmore » on-site inspection (OSI) infrastructure. (3) To confirm the efficacy of using bilateral tabletop exercises to assist in developing an effective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime. (4) To identify strong and weak points in the preparation and implementation methods of such exercises for the purpose of further improving possible future exercises.« less
  • This document is appendices D-J for the Special Nuclear Materials Cutoff Exercise: Issues and Lessons Learned. Included are discussions of the US IAEA Treaty, safeguard regulations for nuclear materials, issue sheets for the PUREX process, and the LANL follow up activity for reprocessing nuclear materials.