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Title: Game Theoretic Evaluation of Threat Detection Problems-The Central Role of the Adversary

Abstract

A wide variety of security problems hinge on the detection of threats and discrimination of threats from innocuous objects. The theory that frames these problems is common among medical diagnostics, radar and sonar imaging, and detection of radiological, chemical, and biological agents. In many of these problems, the nature of the threat is subject to control by a malicious adversary, and the choice of a reference (or "design basis") threat is a very diffcult, and often intractable, aspect of the problem. It is this class of problems that this report considers.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1133254
Report Number(s):
PNNL-16356
400904120
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Heasler, Patrick G., Wood, Thomas W., and Reichmuth, Barbara A. Game Theoretic Evaluation of Threat Detection Problems-The Central Role of the Adversary. United States: N. p., 2007. Web. doi:10.2172/1133254.
Heasler, Patrick G., Wood, Thomas W., & Reichmuth, Barbara A. Game Theoretic Evaluation of Threat Detection Problems-The Central Role of the Adversary. United States. doi:10.2172/1133254.
Heasler, Patrick G., Wood, Thomas W., and Reichmuth, Barbara A. Mon . "Game Theoretic Evaluation of Threat Detection Problems-The Central Role of the Adversary". United States. doi:10.2172/1133254. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1133254.
@article{osti_1133254,
title = {Game Theoretic Evaluation of Threat Detection Problems-The Central Role of the Adversary},
author = {Heasler, Patrick G. and Wood, Thomas W. and Reichmuth, Barbara A.},
abstractNote = {A wide variety of security problems hinge on the detection of threats and discrimination of threats from innocuous objects. The theory that frames these problems is common among medical diagnostics, radar and sonar imaging, and detection of radiological, chemical, and biological agents. In many of these problems, the nature of the threat is subject to control by a malicious adversary, and the choice of a reference (or "design basis") threat is a very diffcult, and often intractable, aspect of the problem. It is this class of problems that this report considers.},
doi = {10.2172/1133254},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2007},
month = {Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2007}
}

Technical Report:

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