skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

Abstract

Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to themore » Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC. For the nuclear industry to reap the benefits of SBD (i.e. avoid cost overruns and construction schedule slippages), nuclear facility designers and operators should work closely with the State Regulatory Authority and IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. Ideally, this interaction should begin during the conceptual design phase and continue throughout construction and start-up of a nuclear facility. Such early coordination and planning could influence decisions on the design of the nuclear material processing flow-sheet, material storage and handling arrangements, and facility layout (including safeguards equipment), etc.« less

Authors:
;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Sponsoring Org.:
DOE - NE
OSTI Identifier:
1054717
Report Number(s):
INL/CON-12-26130
DOE Contract Number:  
DE-AC07-05ID14517
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 2012 ANS Winter Meeting and Nuclear Technology Expo,San Diego, California,11/11/2012,11/15/2012
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; Fuel; High Temperature Gas Reactors; HTGR; Prismatic; safeguards; safeguards by design; SBD

Citation Formats

Mark Schanfein, and Casey Durst. Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel. United States: N. p., 2012. Web.
Mark Schanfein, & Casey Durst. Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel. United States.
Mark Schanfein, and Casey Durst. Thu . "Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel". United States.
@article{osti_1054717,
title = {Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel},
author = {Mark Schanfein and Casey Durst},
abstractNote = {Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC. For the nuclear industry to reap the benefits of SBD (i.e. avoid cost overruns and construction schedule slippages), nuclear facility designers and operators should work closely with the State Regulatory Authority and IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. Ideally, this interaction should begin during the conceptual design phase and continue throughout construction and start-up of a nuclear facility. Such early coordination and planning could influence decisions on the design of the nuclear material processing flow-sheet, material storage and handling arrangements, and facility layout (including safeguards equipment), etc.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2012},
month = {11}
}

Conference:
Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that hold this conference proceeding.

Save / Share: