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Title: Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

Abstract

The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

Authors:
 [1]
+ Show Author Affiliations
  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
DOE/LANL
OSTI Identifier:
1047122
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-12-23467
TRN: US1203975
DOE Contract Number:
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS; ACCURACY; COMPUTER CODES; DETECTION; PERFORMANCE; SAFEGUARDS; SIMULATION; TRANSPORT

Citation Formats

Swinhoe, Martyn T. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards. United States: N. p., 2012. Web. doi:10.2172/1047122.
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Swinhoe, Martyn T. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards. United States. doi:10.2172/1047122.
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Swinhoe, Martyn T. Thu . "Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards". United States. doi:10.2172/1047122. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1047122.
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@article{osti_1047122,
title = {Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards},
author = {Swinhoe, Martyn T.},
abstractNote = {The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.},
doi = {10.2172/1047122},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Jul 26 00:00:00 EDT 2012},
month = {Thu Jul 26 00:00:00 EDT 2012}
}
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Technical Report:
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DOI:  10.2172/1047122
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