skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

Abstract

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect tomore » undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.« less

Authors:
 [1];  [1]
  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1029934
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-11-03999; LA-UR-11-3999
TRN: US1105878
DOE Contract Number:  
AC52-06NA25396
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: INMM Annual Meeting ; July 17, 2011 ; Desert Springs, CA
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; ARMS CONTROL; DESIGN; DETECTION; FISSILE MATERIALS; IAEA; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; IMPLEMENTATION; MEMBER STATES; NUCLEAR POWER; PLANNING; PROCUREMENT; PRODUCTION; SAFEGUARDS; TRANSFORMATIONS; VERIFICATION

Citation Formats

Pilat, Joseph F, and Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses. United States: N. p., 2011. Web.
Pilat, Joseph F, & Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses. United States.
Pilat, Joseph F, and Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W. Sat . "The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1029934.
@article{osti_1029934,
title = {The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses},
author = {Pilat, Joseph F and Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W},
abstractNote = {For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2011},
month = {1}
}

Conference:
Other availability
Please see Document Availability for additional information on obtaining the full-text document. Library patrons may search WorldCat to identify libraries that hold this conference proceeding.

Save / Share: