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Title: Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement Project

Abstract

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Sponsoring Org.:
DOE - NE
OSTI Identifier:
1023479
Report Number(s):
INL/EXT-11-22381
TRN: US1104588
DOE Contract Number:
DE-AC07-05ID14517
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS; CAPITAL; DESIGN; HAZARDOUS MATERIALS; MODIFICATIONS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; PROGRAM MANAGEMENT; RELIABILITY; SAFETY; TEST REACTORS; safety design strategy

Citation Formats

Noel Duckwitz. Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement Project. United States: N. p., 2011. Web. doi:10.2172/1023479.
Noel Duckwitz. Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement Project. United States. doi:10.2172/1023479.
Noel Duckwitz. 2011. "Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement Project". United States. doi:10.2172/1023479. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1023479.
@article{osti_1023479,
title = {Safety Design Strategy for the Advanced Test Reactor Emergency Firewater Injection System Replacement Project},
author = {Noel Duckwitz},
abstractNote = {In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.},
doi = {10.2172/1023479},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2011,
month = 6
}

Technical Report:

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  • In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,”more » provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.« less
  • In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3B, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3B and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,”more » provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Advanced Test Reactor Reliability Sustainment Project. While this project does not introduce new hazards to the ATR, it has the potential for significant impacts to safety-related systems, structures, and components that are credited in the ATR safety basis and are being replaced. Thus the project has been determined to meet the definition of a major modification and is being managed accordingly.« less
  • The continued safe and reliable operation of the ATR is critical to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) mission. While ATR is safely fulfilling current mission requirements, a variety of aging and obsolescence issues challenge ATR engineering and maintenance personnel’s capability to sustain ATR over the long term. First documented in a series of independent assessments, beginning with an OA Environmental Safety and Health Assessment conducted in 2003, the issues were validated in a detailed Material Condition Assessment (MCA) conducted as a part of the ATR Life Extension Program in 2007.Accordingly, near term replacement of agingmore » and obsolescent original ATR equipment has become important to ensure ATR capability in support of NE’s long term national missions. To that end, a mission needs statement has been prepared for a non-major system acquisition which is comprised of three interdependent sub-projects. The first project will replace the existent diesel-electrical bus (E-3), switchgear, and the fifty year old antiquated marine diesels with commercial power that is backed with safety-related emergency diesel generators (EDGs), switchgear, and uninterruptible power supply. The second project will replace the four, obsolete, original primary coolant pumps and motors. The third project, the subject of this major modification determination, will replace the current emergency firewater injection system (EFIS). The replacement water injection system will function as the primary emergency water injection system with the EFIS being retained as a defense-in-depth backup. Completion of this and the two other age-related projects (replacement of the ATR diesel bus (E-3) and switchgear and replacement of the existent aged primary coolant pumps and motors) will resolve major age-related operational issues plus make a significant contribution in sustaining the ATR safety and reliability profile. The major modification criteria evaluation of the project pre-conceptual design identified several issues that lead to the conclusion that the project is a major modification.« less
  • This project characterizes typical two-phase stratified flow conditions in advanced water reactor horizontal pipe sections, following activation of passive cooling systems. It provides (1) a means to educate nuclear engineering students regarding the importance of two-phase stratified flow in passive cooling systems to the safety of advanced reactor systems and (2) describes the experimental apparatus and process to measure key parameters essential to consider when designing passive emergency core cooling flow paths that may encounter this flow regime. Based on data collected, the state of analysis capabilities can be determined regarding stratified flow in advanced reactor systems and the bestmore » paths forward can be identified to ensure that the nuclear industry can properly characterize two-phase stratified flow in passive emergency core cooling systems.« less
  • S>Criteria work performed, prior to the termination of work on the package concept, for the liquid metal loop facilities for the Advanced Test Reactor is described. Nuclear criteria were determined for the thermal neutron filter and extended core combination in conjunction with the reference test specimen for the Fast Flux Loop. The conceptual design of the thermal loop is discussed, including the in-core section, sodium-to-helium heat exchanger, helium- to-reactor water heat exchanger, pump motor and associated bearing design requirements, preliminary shielding requirements, control system requirements, and electrical heaters within tue permissible space envelope. As the criteria work progressed it wasmore » determined that despite the accomplishments, not all the program requirements could be satisfied. (M.C.G.)« less