LLNL Contribution to Sandia Used Fuel Disposition - Security March 2011 Deliverable
Cleary [2007] divides the proliferation pathway into stages: diversion, facility misuse, transportation, transformation, and weapons fabrication. King [2010], using Cleary's methodology, compares a deepburn fusion-driven blanket containing weapons-grade plutonium with a PWR burning MOX fuel enrichments of 5-9%. King considers the stages of theft, transportation, transformation, and nuclear explosive fabrication. In the current study of used fuel storage security, a similar approach is appropriate. First, one must consider the adversary's objective, which can be categorized as on-site radionuclide dispersion, theft of material for later radionuclide dispersion, and theft of material for later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive. For on-site radionuclide dispersion, only a single proliferation pathway stage is appropriate: dispersion. That situation will be addressed in future reports. For later radionuclide dispersion, the stages are theft, transportation, and transformation (from oxide spent fuel containing both fission products and actinides to a material size and shape suitable for dispersion). For later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive, the stages are theft (by an outsider or by facility misuse by an insider), transportation, transformation (from oxide spent fuel containing both fission products and actinides to a metal alloy), and fabrication (of the alloy into a weapon). It should be noted that the theft and transportation stages are similar, and possibly identical, for later radionuclide dispersion and later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive. Each stage can be evaluated separately, and the methodology can vary for each stage. For example, King starts with the methodology of Cleary for the theft, transportation, transformation, and fabrication stages. Then, for each stage, King assembles and modifies the attributes and inputs suggested by Cleary. In the theft (also known as diversion) stage, Cleary has five high-level categories (material handling during diversion, difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system, difficulty of evading detection by the material control system, difficulty of conducting undeclared facility modifications for the purpose of diverting nuclear material, and difficulty of evading detection of the facility modifications for the purposes of diverting nuclear material). Each category has one or more subcategories. For example, the first category includes mass per significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material, volume/SQ of nuclear material, number of items/SQ, material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas), radiation level in terms of dose, chemical reactivity, heat load, and process temperature. King adds the following two subcategories to that list: SQs available for theft, and interruptions/changes (normal and unexpected) in material stocks and flows. For the situation of an orphaned surface storage facility, this approach is applicable, with some of the categories and subcategories being modified to reflect the static situation (no additions or removals of fuel or containers). In addition, theft would require opening a large overpack and either removing a full container or opening that sealed container and then removing one or more spent nuclear fuel assemblies. These activities would require time without observation (detection), heavy-duty equipment, and some degree of protection of the thieves from radiological dose. In the transportation stage, Cleary has two high-level categories (difficulty of handling material during transportation, and difficulty of evading detection during transport). Each category has a number of subcategories. For the situation of an orphaned surface storage facility, these categories are applicable. The transformation stage of Cleary has three high-level categories (facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials; knowledge, skills, and workforce needed to process diverted materials; and difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities). Again, there are subcategories. King [2007] adds a fourth high-level category: time required to transform the materials. For the situation of an orphaned surface storage facility, the categories are applicable, but the evaluations of each category and subcategory will be significantly different for later radionuclide dispersion than for later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive. The fabrication stage of Cleary has three high-level categories (difficulty associated with design, handling difficulties, and knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate). King replaces the first two high-level categories with the Figure of Merit for Nuclear Explosives Utility (FOM), with subcategories of bare critical mass, heat content of transformed material, dose rate of transformed material, and SQs available for theft. The next section of this report describes the FOM in more detail.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 1022146
- Report Number(s):
- LLNL-TR-476151; TRN: US1104321
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND NON-RACIOACTIVE WASTER FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES
ACTINIDES
ALLOYS
CONTAINERS
CONTROL SYSTEMS
CRITICAL MASS
DETECTION
DOSE RATES
FABRICATION
FISSION PRODUCTS
MODIFICATIONS
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
NUCLEAR FUELS
OXIDES
PLUTONIUM
PROLIFERATION
RADIATIONS
RADIOISOTOPES
SECURITY
SPENT FUELS
STORAGE
THEFT
TRANSFORMATIONS