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Title: Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

Abstract

This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4)more » preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.« less

Authors:
;  [1];  [2]
  1. Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy
  2. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
10165516
Report Number(s):
SAND-94-1265
ON: DE94015167; TRN: 94:007313
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: Apr 1994
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; 29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; PROLIFERATION; SAFETY; PUBLIC OPINION; SECURITY; 350200; 290600; NUCLEAR ENERGY

Citation Formats

Jenkins-Smith, H.C., Herron, K.G., and Barke, R.P.. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. United States: N. p., 1994. Web. doi:10.2172/10165516.
Jenkins-Smith, H.C., Herron, K.G., & Barke, R.P.. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. United States. doi:10.2172/10165516.
Jenkins-Smith, H.C., Herron, K.G., and Barke, R.P.. Fri . "Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment". United States. doi:10.2172/10165516. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/10165516.
@article{osti_10165516,
title = {Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment},
author = {Jenkins-Smith, H.C. and Herron, K.G. and Barke, R.P.},
abstractNote = {This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.},
doi = {10.2172/10165516},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Fri Apr 01 00:00:00 EST 1994},
month = {Fri Apr 01 00:00:00 EST 1994}
}

Technical Report:

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  • The United States and the former Soviet Union have made and continue to make historic progress toward nuclear weapons disarmament. In 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev decided to destroy or withdraw (FROM FORWARD-DEPLOYED UNITS) all land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. This paper examines why Regional CINCs must retain a substrategic nuclear weapons capability until substantial improvements are made in our anti-tactical missile defense systems. The threat of nuclear proliferation and the deterrent value of tactical nuclear weapons are discussed. The paper also addresses the issue of tactical nuclear weapons as a warfighting capability and concludes that Combatant Commanders won'tmore » need this capability once we improve our theater-based missile defense systems..... Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Post Cold War Era: Implications for the Operational Commander.« less
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