Data Analysis
- ORNL
Analysis of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. A self-appraisal helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) fault tree was developed to depict the failure of the MPC&A system as a result of poor practices and random failures in the MC&A system. It can also be employed as a basis for assessing deliberate threats against a facility. MSET uses fault tree analysis, which is a top-down approach to examining system failure. The analysis starts with identifying a potential undesirable event called a 'top event' and then determining the ways it can occur (e.g., 'Fail To Maintain Nuclear Materials Under The Purview Of The MC&A System'). The analysis proceeds by determining how the top event can be caused by individual or combined lower level faults or failures. These faults, which are the causes of the top event, are 'connected' through logic gates. The MSET model uses AND-gates and OR-gates and propagates the effect of event failure using Boolean algebra. To enable the fault tree analysis calculations, the basic events in the fault tree are populated with probability risk values derived by conversion of questionnaire data to numeric values. The basic events are treated as independent variables. This assumption affects the Boolean algebraic calculations used to calculate results. All the necessary calculations are built into the fault tree codes, but it is often useful to estimate the probabilities manually as a check on code functioning. The probability of failure of a given basic event is the probability that the basic event primary question fails to meet the performance metric for that question. The failure probability is related to how well the facility performs the task identified in that basic event over time (not just one performance or exercise). Fault tree calculations provide a failure probability for the top event in the fault tree. The basic fault tree calculations establish a baseline relative risk value for the system. This probability depicts relative risk, not absolute risk. Subsequent calculations are made to evaluate the change in relative risk that would occur if system performance is improved or degraded. During the development effort of MSET, the fault tree analysis program used was SAPHIRE. SAPHIRE is an acronym for 'Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations.' Version 1 of the SAPHIRE code was sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1987 as an innovative way to draw, edit, and analyze graphical fault trees primarily for safe operation of nuclear power reactors. When the fault tree calculations are performed, the fault tree analysis program will produce several reports that can be used to analyze the MPC&A system. SAPHIRE produces reports showing risk importance factors for all basic events in the operational MC&A system. The risk importance information is used to examine the potential impacts when performance of certain basic events increases or decreases. The initial results produced by the SAPHIRE program are considered relative risk values. None of the results can be interpreted as absolute risk values since the basic event probability values represent estimates of risk associated with the performance of MPC&A tasks throughout the material balance area (MBA). The RRR for a basic event represents the decrease in total system risk that would result from improvement of that one event to a perfect performance level. Improvement of the basic event with the greatest RRR value produces a greater decrease in total system risk than improvement of any other basic event. Basic events with the greatest potential for system risk reduction are assigned performance improvement values, and new fault tree calculations show the improvement in total system risk. The operational impact or cost-effectiveness from implementing the performance improvements can then be evaluated. The improvements being evaluated can be system performance improvements, or they can be potential, or actual, upgrades to the system. The RIR for a basic event represents the increase in total system risk that would result from failure of that one event. Failure of the basic event with the greatest RIR value produces a greater increase in total system risk than failure of any other basic event. Basic events with the greatest potential for system risk increase are assigned failure performance values, and new fault tree calculations show the increase in total system risk. This evaluation shows the importance of preventing performance degradation of the basic events. SAPHIRE identifies combinations of basic events where concurrent failure of the events results in failure of the top event.
- Research Organization:
- Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC05-00OR22725
- OSTI ID:
- 1016061
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 10th Central Asia MC&A Conference, Astana, Kazakhstan, 20110516, 20110520
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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