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Title: 662-E solid waste silo-plug lifting analysis

Abstract

The Intermediate Level Tritium Vault No. 1, 662-E, Cell No. 1 contains 140 waste silos. Each silo is approximately 25 feet deep, 30 inches in diameter at the top and covered by a reinforced concrete plug. Two No. 4 reinforcing bars project from the top of each plug for lifting. During lifting operations, the 1.5 inch concrete cover over the lifting bars spelled off 16% of the silo plugs. The No. 4 reinforcing bars were also distorted on many of the silo plugs. Thirteen of the plugs have been repaired to date. The existing silo plug lifting bars have a safe working load of 480 pounds per plug, which is less than 1/3 of the dead weight of the silo plug. The safe working load was calculated using the minimum design factor of 3 based on the yield strength or 5 based on the ultimate strength of the material, as per the Savannah River Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. The existing design calculations were reviewed, and the following items are noted: (1) Adequate concrete cover was not provided over the horizontal portion of the lifting bars. (2) The lifting bars were allowed to yield in bending, which violates the requirementsmore » of the Savannah River Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. (3) The ultimate strain of the lifting bars would be exceeded before the calculated ultimate strength was achieved. Alternative lifting devices are also identified.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
10159902
Report Number(s):
WSRC-TR-93-172; SRT-EMT-93-1035
ON: DE93014728; TRN: 93:001480
DOE Contract Number:
AC09-89SR18035
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: Mar 1993
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; 54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES; DISPOSAL WELLS; CLOSURES; PLUGGING; DESIGN; MECHANICAL PROPERTIES; RADIOACTIVE WASTES; TRITIUM; REINFORCED CONCRETE; YIELD STRENGTH; ULTIMATE STRENGTH; HOISTING; BENDING; UNDERGROUND DISPOSAL; SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT; 052002; 540250; WASTE DISPOSAL AND STORAGE; SITE RESOURCE AND USE STUDIES

Citation Formats

Mertz, G.E.. 662-E solid waste silo-plug lifting analysis. United States: N. p., 1993. Web. doi:10.2172/10159902.
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Mertz, G.E.. 662-E solid waste silo-plug lifting analysis. United States. doi:10.2172/10159902.
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Mertz, G.E.. Mon . "662-E solid waste silo-plug lifting analysis". United States. doi:10.2172/10159902. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/10159902.
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@article{osti_10159902,
title = {662-E solid waste silo-plug lifting analysis},
author = {Mertz, G.E.},
abstractNote = {The Intermediate Level Tritium Vault No. 1, 662-E, Cell No. 1 contains 140 waste silos. Each silo is approximately 25 feet deep, 30 inches in diameter at the top and covered by a reinforced concrete plug. Two No. 4 reinforcing bars project from the top of each plug for lifting. During lifting operations, the 1.5 inch concrete cover over the lifting bars spelled off 16% of the silo plugs. The No. 4 reinforcing bars were also distorted on many of the silo plugs. Thirteen of the plugs have been repaired to date. The existing silo plug lifting bars have a safe working load of 480 pounds per plug, which is less than 1/3 of the dead weight of the silo plug. The safe working load was calculated using the minimum design factor of 3 based on the yield strength or 5 based on the ultimate strength of the material, as per the Savannah River Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. The existing design calculations were reviewed, and the following items are noted: (1) Adequate concrete cover was not provided over the horizontal portion of the lifting bars. (2) The lifting bars were allowed to yield in bending, which violates the requirements of the Savannah River Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. (3) The ultimate strain of the lifting bars would be exceeded before the calculated ultimate strength was achieved. Alternative lifting devices are also identified.},
doi = {10.2172/10159902},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Mon Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1993},
month = {Mon Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1993}
}
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DOI:  10.2172/10159902
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  • The Intermediate Level Tritium Vault No. 1, 662-E, Cell No. 1 contains 140 waste silos. Each silo is approximately 25 feet deep, 30 inches in diameter at the top and covered by a reinforced concrete plug. Two No. 4 reinforcing bars project from the top of each plug for lifting. During lifting operations, the 1.5 inch concrete cover over the lifting bars spelled off 16% of the silo plugs. The No. 4 reinforcing bars were also distorted on many of the silo plugs. Thirteen of the plugs have been repaired to date. The existing silo plug lifting bars have amore » safe working load of 480 pounds per plug, which is less than 1/3 of the dead weight of the silo plug. The safe working load was calculated using the minimum design factor of 3 based on the yield strength or 5 based on the ultimate strength of the material, as per the Savannah River Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. The existing design calculations were reviewed, and the following items are noted: (1) Adequate concrete cover was not provided over the horizontal portion of the lifting bars. (2) The lifting bars were allowed to yield in bending, which violates the requirements of the Savannah River Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. (3) The ultimate strain of the lifting bars would be exceeded before the calculated ultimate strength was achieved. Alternative lifting devices are also identified.« less

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  • This supporting document details calculations for the proper design of a lifting beam and redesigned lifting lugs for the 241AZO1A decant pump. This design is in accordance with Standard Architectural-Civil Design Criteria, Design Loads for Facilities (DOE-RL 1989) and is safety class three. The design and fabrication is in accordance with American Institute of Steel Construction, Manual of Steel Construction, (AISC, 1989) and the Hanford Hoisting and Rigging Manual (DOE-RL 1993).

  • Vitrification is the technology that has been chosen to solidify approximately 18,000 tons of geologic mill tailings at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) in Fernald, Ohio. The geologic mill tailings are residues from the processing of pitchlende ore during 1949-1958. These waste residues are contained in silos in Operable Unit 4 (OU4) at the FEMP facility. Operable Unit 4 is one of five operable units at the FEMP. Operable Unit 4 is one of five operable units at the FEMP. Operating Unit 4 consists of four concrete storage silos and their contents. Silos 1 and 2 contain K-65 millmore » tailing residues and a bentonite cap, Silo 3 contains non-radioactive metal oxides, and Silo 4 is empty.« less

  • ;
    Vitrification is the technology that has been chosen to solidify approximately 15,500 tons of geologic mill tailings at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) in Fernald, Ohio. The geologic mill tailings are residues from the processing of pitchlende ore during 1949-1958. These waste residues are contained in silos in Operable Unit 4 (OU4) at the FEMP facility. Operable Unit 4 is one of five operable units at the FEMP. Operating Unit 4 consists of four concrete storage silos and their contents. Silos 1 and 2 contain K-65 mill tailing residues and a bentonite cap, Silo 3 contains non-radioactive metal oxides,more » and Silo 4 is empty. The K-65 residues contain radium, uranium, uranium daughter products, and heavy metals such as lead and barium.The K-65 waste leaches lead at greater than 100 times the allowable Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) concentration limits when tested by the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). Vitrification was chosen by FEMP as the preferred technology for the Silos 1, 2, 3 wastes because the final waste form met the following criteria: controls radon emanation, eliminates the potential for hazardous or radioactive constituents to migrate to the aquifer below FEMP, controls the spread of radioactive particulates, reduces leachability of metals and radiological constituents, reduces volume of final wasteform for disposal, silo waste composition is favorable to vitrification, will meet current and proposed RCRA TCLP leaching criteria Glasses that melt at 1350 degrees C were developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and glasses that melt between 1150-1350 degrees C were developed by the Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) for the K-65 silo wastes. Both crucible studies and pilot scale vitrification studies were conducted by PNNL and VSL. Subsequently, a Vitrification Pilot Plant (VPP) was constructed at FEMP capable of operating at temperatures up to 1450 degrees C. The VPP began operation on June 19, 1996. The VPP was used to test surrogate FEMP wastes at melt temperatures between 1130 degrees C and 1350 {degrees}C. The VPP failed on December 26, 1996 while processing surrogate waste. After the failure of the FEMP VPP, vitrification technology and glass chemistry were reevaluated. This report documents the glass formulation development for K-65 waste completed at SRTC in April, 1993 in conjunction with Associated Technical Consultants (ATC) of Toledo, Ohio. The glass developed for the FEMP was formulated in a lithia substituted soda-lime-silica (SLS) glass per the Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) patented Lithia Additive Melting Process (LAMP)* to avoid problematic phase separation known to occur in the borosilicate glass system (MO-B{sub 2}O{sub 3}- SiO{sub 2}), where (MO = CaO, MgO, BaO, and PbO). Lime, MgO, BaO and PbO are all constituents of the FEMP wastes and thus subject to phase separation when vitrified in borosilicate glass. Phase separation is known to compromise waste glass stability. The SRTC soda-lithia-lime- silica (SLLS) glass melted at 1050 degrees C. Similar SLLS glass formulations have recently been demonstrated at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in a full scale melter with mixed (radioactive and hazardous) wastes.The low melting temperatures achieved with the SLLS glass minimize volatilization of hazardous species such as arsenic, lead, and selenium during vitrification. An 81 percent K-65 waste loading was demonstrated. The SRTC SLLS glass passed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Toxic Characteristic Leach Procedure (TCLP) for all the hazardous constituents of concern under the current regulations. The SLLS glass is as durable as the high melting PNNL SLS glass and is more durable than the borosilicate glasses previously developed by VSL for the K-65 wastes.« less