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Title: Operating history of Hanford Piles

Abstract

This document has been written because of a request for information from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. Hanford operating experience has been summarized in terms of operating hours, startups and scram analysis.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
General Electric Co., Richland, WA (United States). Hanford Atomic Products Operation
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
10104677
Report Number(s):
HW-37304
ON: DE93003406
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 15 Jun 1955
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS; HANFORD PRODUCTION REACTORS; REACTOR OPERATION; SCRAM; REACTOR START-UP; MAINTENANCE; FUEL ELEMENTS; REACTOR SAFETY; 220900; 220600; RESEARCH, TEST, TRAINING, PRODUCTION, IRRADIATION, MATERIALS TESTING REACTORS

Citation Formats

Talbott, J.W. Operating history of Hanford Piles. United States: N. p., 1955. Web. doi:10.2172/10104677.
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Talbott, J.W. Operating history of Hanford Piles. United States. doi:10.2172/10104677.
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Talbott, J.W. Wed . "Operating history of Hanford Piles". United States. doi:10.2172/10104677. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/10104677.
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@article{osti_10104677,
title = {Operating history of Hanford Piles},
author = {Talbott, J.W.},
abstractNote = {This document has been written because of a request for information from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. Hanford operating experience has been summarized in terms of operating hours, startups and scram analysis.},
doi = {10.2172/10104677},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Jun 15 00:00:00 EDT 1955},
month = {Wed Jun 15 00:00:00 EDT 1955}
}
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Technical Report:
View Technical Report (0.43 MB)
DOI:  10.2172/10104677
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