Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

Title: Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

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Abstract

Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements ofmore »« less

Authors:

Doyle, James ^[1]

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Publication Date:: 2010-01-01

Research Org.:: Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE

OSTI Identifier:: 1009558

Report Number(s):: LA-UR-10-02687; LA-UR-10-2687
TRN: US1101535

DOE Contract Number:: AC52-06NA25396

Resource Type:: Journal Article

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 98; ARMS CONTROL; FISSILE MATERIALS; MONITORING; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; STORAGE; TREATIES; VERIFICATION

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                    Doyle, James. Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions.  United States: N. p., 2010. 
        Web.

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                    Doyle, James. Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions.  United States.

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                    Doyle, James. Fri .  
        "Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions".  United States.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1009558.

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@article{osti_1009558,

  title        = {Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions},

  author       = {Doyle, James},

  abstractNote = {Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information for establishing a conceptual approach to a five-year technical program plan for research and development of nuclear arms reductions verification and transparency technologies and procedures.},

  doi          = {},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1009558},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {2010},

  month        = {1}

}

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