Evaluating late detection capability against diverse insider adversaries

Conference · Thu Dec 03 00:00:00 EST 1987

OSTI ID:5028064

Sicherman, A

This paper describes a model for evaluating the late (after-the-fact) detection capability of material control and accountability (MCandA) systems against insider theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Potential insider cover-up strategies to defeat activities providing detection (e.g., inventories) are addressed by the model in a tractable manner. For each potential adversary and detection activity, two probabilities are assessed and used to fit the model. The model then computes the probability of detection for activities occurring periodically over time. The model provides insight into MCandA effectiveness and helps identify areas for safeguards improvement. 4 refs., 4 tabs.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 5028064
• Report Number(s): UCRL-97740; CONF-8711108-3; ON: DE88008678
• Resource Relation: Conference: American Nuclear Society topical conference, San Diego, CA, USA, 29 Nov 1987
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
SECURITY VIOLATIONS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
DETECTION
INVENTORIES
PROBABILITY
SECURITY
STATISTICS
THEFT
CRIME
INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
MATHEMATICS
VIOLATIONS
055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability- Technical Aspects