Thursday, May 4, 1995

1:00 p.m.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY EXTENSION CONFERENCE

The United Nations

New York City

POV: From Words to Action

I. CLINTON NON-PROLIFERATION VISION

(Board with quote from State of the Union -- 1/24/95)

1. Recognized that character of nuclear threat has changed

2. Previous threat was clear and visible -- superpower nuclear war

3. New threat is less obvious -- more insidious and diffuse -- Face is not always clear

• Placed high priority on nonproliferation and developed a broad agenda for action
• Agenda includes infusing international relationship with nonproliferation issues
• Vision focused on progress through an aggressive agenda
• Agenda is pragmatic prescription for the new threat but is non- traditional
  • Emphasis on fissile material control and nuclear test ban

II. INDEFINITE EXTENSION -- IT'S ESSENTIAL

(bullets)

• Historic Opportunity
  • This conference is an historic event
    • Only opportunity NPT Parties have to:
      • Extend the nonproliferation treaty indefinitely;
      • Decision is binding on all parties without further national action

  • Permanent Barrier

    Indefinite extension benefits

    • Would create a permanent barrier to proliferation
    • Would create a more stable, secure, environment for further nuclear disarmament; and,
    • Would give treaty same duration of other international arms control treaties

    Downside of limited duration

    • Limited term of treaty would undermine the possibility of further nuclear reductions

  • Building Block (for the Future)

    New Members are NPT Success Stories

    • Value of NPT underscored by nations that continue to join 25 years after it began
    • South Africa -- Joined NPT and renounced its nuclear weapons
    • Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine -- evicting nuclear weapons from territory that once belonged to USSR
    • Leading by example:
      • BELARUS -- made decisive declaration soon after Soviet breakup --> to create momentum for dismantlement of former Soviet weapons
      • KAZAKHSTAN -- reduces nuclear danger with acceptance of full-scope safeguards and implementation of physical protection measures
      • UKRAINE -- NPT offers security assurances to Ukraine as a member

  III. DEEP REDUCTIONS

  (chart of U.S. strategic warheads)

  • Remove the Threat

    [NOTE: Numbers on the chart refer to strategic nuclear warheads. Tactical weapons excluded. START I warhead numbers are those accountable under the treaty. True number of deployed warheads is classified and somewhat higher.]

  • Nuclear Weapons Reductions are critical element of Clinton vision for nonproliferation to remove the threat
  • Critics -- even within DOE and national labs -- question need or ability to disarm and dismantle weapons -- they ignore the fact that necessity and commitment are greater than ever in past
  • Nuclear weapons reductions as result of START I and START II make deep reductions highest priority of weapons program
  • Clinton-Yeltsin Statement provides opportunity for further reductions beyond START
  • Reductions are only half of the goal -- we are also dismantling close to 2000 warheads each year.

  IV. IRREVERSIBLE REDUCTIONS

  (chart of newspaper headlines)

  • Changed nature of nuclear threat requires new approach to problem
  • Nuclear competition between U.S. and Russia replaced by cooperation in denuclearization
    • Both countries making progress in weapons reduction, dismantlement based on openness and transparency

  • Unprecedented effort for cooperation between long-standing competitors -- exchange information on weapons complex, dismantlement, environmental management, other scientific areas
  • Openness critical to confidence building
  • DOE cooperation with Russian counterparts is extensive --
    • Exchange visits to weapons sites and labs now commonplace
    • Presidents have agreed to exchange information necessary to further weapons reductions and dismantlement

  • Agreement in place to allow exchange of information on warhead dismantlement practices
  • Site visits have occurred to further the goal of confirming warhead dismantlement
  • U.S. and Russia working together to secure nuclear materials
  • U.S. and Russia working together to blend down uranium from warheads into reactor fuel

    Measures under consideration and negotiation

  • Monitor chain of custody for weapons to verify dismantlement
  • Agreement to allow exchange of classified information to allow for greater collaboration -- this is unprecedented
  • Potential for verification of dismantlement to increase international confidence

  V. END PRODUCTION

  (photo of nuclear weapons plant with European road sign)

  • U.S. concerned about all weapons-usable fissile materials
    • Important piece of international framework for international security is capping production of fissile materials world-wide
    • U.S. had stopped production of fissile materials for weapons by 1988
    • Clinton Administration went further and ended the Integral Fast Reactor Program last year.
      • IFR would have continued recycling and use of plutonium in the U.S. and set a bad example for the world

    • U.S. also pushes for the elimination of use of highly enriched uranium
      • Spent fuel takeback from foreign research reactors proves the commitment to this goal
      • Program replacing highly enriched uranium with low enriched uranium in research reactors expanded to Russia and China

    • President s Nonproliferation Policy also proposed MULTILATERAL FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY
      • A mandate in Conference for Disarmament in Geneva now agreed upon
      • We must commit to make more progress in this area

    • Clinton Administration goes beyond this proposed treaty to accomplish immediate results to.....
    • U.S. - Russia Agreement -- June 1994
      • Move on fast-track to shutdown plutonium production reactors
      • Cease use of newly produced plutonium for weapons production
      • Nails in the coffin of Cold War

    VI. WHY TRITIUM

    • Recent news reports raise questions about the U.S. commitment to nuclear disarmament because it is finding a new tritium source.
    • Here are some facts about Tritium:
      • It is not a fissile material
      • The U.S. has not produced any since 1988
      • The gas has a short life and therefore needs to be replenished periodically
      • The U.S. does not need new tritium today.
      • The U.S. is recycling tritium from retired weapons in order to reduce the amount needed for new production.

    • A decision on future tritium production is not a first step in developing new nuclear weapons.
    • The DOE budget request in no way prevents the United States from reducing weapons under START I and II.
    • The budget request does not prevent consideration of implementation of nuclear weapons reductions below START II levels.
    • In fact, should warhead reductions below START II be implemented, more tritium could be recycled from these weapons.

    VII. WE'VE STOPPED

    (Time Line of nuclear testing)

    • Moratorium on U.S. Nuclear Testing
      • U.S. setting the example -- last test in 1992
      • On the assumption that a treaty will be signed before September 30, 1996, and subject to the same understandings that govern our current moratorium, the

        President has decided to extend the moratorium on U.S. nuclear tests until a CTB Treaty enters into force.

      • DOE assistance in framing options facilitated decision to stop testing
      • Four of five nuclear weapons states now in moratoria
      • Urge all countries, including China, to join moratorium on nuclear testing

    • Negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
      • U.S. leadership led to re-opening of comprehensive test ban negotiations
      • U.S. goal to reach accord on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible
      • U.S. supporting negotiations which began in Geneva in January 1994
      • Fulfills promise made in Article VI of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament
      • We urge our negotiating partners to work beside us to end nuclear testing for all time

    VIII. EXCESS MATERIAL

    (time line with picture of inspector)

    • President Clinton's nonproliferation policy broke new ground by calling for declaration of excess fissile material and the safeguarding of this material by the IAEA.
    • The President's offer to withdraw 200 tons of nuclear material from our defense stockpile represents an important commitment to our NPT partners.
    • We consider that making excess fissile materials available for international safeguards to be an important step to build confidence for irreversible nuclear arms reduction.
    • IAEA safeguards on excess high enriched uranium in storage at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were initiated in September 1994.
    • In December 1994, the IAEA began safeguards inspection of plutonium in a storage vault at the Hanford site in Washington state.
    • We appreciate the efforts of IAEA in making this a success.
    • We expect to add more excess plutonium to safeguards at Hanford, and we are working to complete preparations for safeguards on a vault at Rocky Flats.
    • DOE has committed to the President to assess the 200 tons. We are preparing options to safeguard the material. Our nuclear materials management plan must deal with difficult issues including:

      addressing sensitive weapons design information

      budgetary constraints

      environmental, safety and health concerns

      nonproliferation goals

    IX. REMOTE MONITORING

    (map of the world with satellite)

    • Represents United States commitment to advanced safeguards techniques
    • The Department of Energy is working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and international partners to explore the use of remote monitoring to strengthen International safeguards.
    • International Remote monitoring began with Australia in January 1994.
    • Since January 1994, remote monitoring systems have been installed in Sweden, Japan, and Argentina.
    • United States/Russia remote monitoring began with Kurchatov Institute in March 1995.
    • Remote monitoring is a win/win technology because it:

      1. improves global nuclear transparency and safeguards;

      2. is much more cost-effective (at least 1/2 the cost of current on-site verifications);

      3. is less intrusive on facility operations;

      4. reduces worker radiation exposure;

      5. protects sensitive information about the material (such as proprietary or classified information).

    • Remote monitoring is composed of cameras, motion detectors, seals, and other types of sensors installed at a nuclear site to detect access to the material and movement within the monitored area.
    • Remote monitoring represents the future in nonproliferation monitoring.
    • The United States and the Department are willing to apply remote monitoring techniques to excess fissile material.

    X. SECURE MATERIALS

    (Picture of security systems at Kurchatov Institute)

    • U.S. and Russia agree securing weapon-usable materials is a top priority
    • Collaborative work assures the world of commitment to nonproliferation
    • Kurchatov Institute is a big success
    • Further progress promised this year at new facilities
    • Russia relied on controls such as, procedures, documents, informants, police, border control to safeguard nuclear facilities
    • DOE laboratories working with Russian labs to deploy security systems based on technology -- rather than societal controls
    • Dramatic improvements in security of nuclear material
    • Positive example for future U.S. cooperation with other institutes

    XI. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

    (graphic of triangle)

  • "Technical assistance" (human health, agriculture, power and radiation safety) is a very beneficial aspect of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
  • U.S. policy is to maintain a reasonable balance between safeguards and technical assistance.
  • The United States continues to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's programs for technical cooperation and assistance.
  • In 1994 the U.S. provided $20 million for peaceful nuclear agreements. In 1995 the U.S. provided $23 million above our obligation.
  • Over the past 16 years, the United States has directly supported nearly 3750 peaceful nuclear cooperation projects with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Equivalent to a mean of 253 projects per year).
  • Key elements of nuclear cooperation are the contributors to improvements in :

    Power (including nuclear safety)

    Human Health

    Agriculture

  • Power:

    The U.S. has supported and participated in:

    • training and fellowships in both the U.S. and Member States to improve safety at individual power stations and improve national regulatory infrastructures
    • education and training programs in radiological protection and nuclear safety
    • voluntary peer reviews of nuclear power plant safety, including operational safety and safety-significant event reviews
    • projects to improve radiation protection infrastructures
    • the establishment of an international convention on nuclear safety

  • Human Health:

    The U.S. has actively supported the International Atomic Energy Agency in projects in:

    • studying effects of infection on malnourished populations
    • improving analytical capabilities to detect and treat cancer
    • training in the use of radioimmunoassay techniques to strengthen the attack on malaria

  • Agriculture:

    The U.S. is committed to support:

    • programs which aim to increase worldwide supplies of safe food.
    • improvement in the varieties of grain crops by increasing their resistance to disease or drought
    • programs which strive to control and understand the correct applications of pesticides and to control and eradicate insect pests such as the Medfly.

  • The United States shows its support to developing countries that are adherents to the NPT through financial assistance, fellowships, training courses and the provision of cost-free experts to the IAEA.
  • Areas which the U.S. has actively supported include:
    • diagnosing and treating disease
    • reducing industrial pollution
    • controlling insect pests
    • improving nutrition
    • improving manufacturing quality.

  • Our full scope support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the International Atomic Energy Agency underscores our commitment to the full range of NPT benefits.

  XII. U.S. DELIVERS

  • April 1995 NPT Extension Conference is historic event
  • Clinton Administration is delivering on bargain of NPT
  • Record of accomplishment is impressive
  • Clinton -Yeltsin Summits resulted in many breakthroughs:
    • Disarmament and dismantlement accomplishments and proposals
    • Detarget missiles
    • Possibility of deeper reductions beyond START II
    • U.S. Leadership for Test Ban Moratorium
    • U.S. Leadership for negotiations of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in Geneva
    • Success in international diplomacy aimed at new NPT members. Critical to controlling spread or potential diversion of nuclear weapons.

  • Gore-Chernomyrdin exchanges successful in infrastructure development of Russia for energy, alternatives to defense complex
  • START II submitted to U.S. Senate; Hearings held; a vote in favor of ratification expected soon.
  • Seek clean conference mandate for NPT Indefinite Extension next week
  • If NPT is extended indefinitely we can build to further successes in the future

  XIII. A YEAR FROM NOW.......

  (bullets)

  • Make commitments and measure our progress toward those important milestones
  • Where should we be a year from now?....
    • Achieved INDEFINITE EXTENSION of Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty
    • Achieved a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in Geneva
      • Stopped nuclear testing for all time in this world

    • Expanded Exchange of Data amongst nations -- continue to build confidence through TRANSPARENT and IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS
      • Openness requires LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE

    • START II implementation underway and the reductions accelerated