Audit Report The Procurement of Safety Class/Safety-Significant Items at the Savannah River Site
The Department of Energy operates several nuclear facilities at its Savannah River Site, and several additional facilities are under construction. This includes the National Nuclear Security Administration's Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) which is designated to help maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX Facility) is being constructed to manufacture commercial nuclear reactor fuel assemblies from weapon-grade plutonium oxide and depleted uranium. The Interim Salt Processing (ISP) project, managed by the Office of Environmental Management, will treat radioactive waste. The Department has committed to procuring products and services for nuclear-related activities that meet or exceed recognized quality assurance standards. Such standards help to ensure the safety and performance of these facilities. To that end, it issued Departmental Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance (QA Order). The QA Order requires the application of Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (NQA-1) for nuclear-related activities. The NQA-1 standard provides requirements and guidelines for the establishment and execution of quality assurance programs during the siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. These requirements, promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, must be applied to 'safety-class' and 'safety-significant' structures, systems and components (SSCs). Safety-class SSCs are defined as those necessary to prevent exposure off site and to protect the public. Safety-significant SSCs are those whose failure could irreversibly impact worker safety such as a fatality, serious injury, or significant radiological or chemical exposure. Due to the importance of protecting the public, workers, and environment, we initiated an audit to determine whether the Department of Energy procured safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that met NQA-1 standards at the Savannah River Site. Our review disclosed that the Department had procured and installed safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that did not meet NQA-1 quality standards. Specifically, we identified multiple instances in which critical components did not meet required quality and safety standards. For example: (1) Three structural components were procured and installed by the prime contractor at Savannah River during construction of the MOX Facility that did not meet the technical specifications for items relied on for safety. These substandard items necessitated costly and time consuming remedial action to, among other things, ensure that nonconforming materials and equipment would function within safety margins; (2) In six instances, items used in the construction of TEF failed to satisfy quality standards. In one of these situations, operating procedures had to be modified to ensure that the problem item did not compromise safety; and (3) Finally, at the ISP, one component that did not meet quality standards was procured. The failure of the item could have resulted in a spill of up to 15,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste. Based on an extensive examination of relevant internal controls and procurement practices, we concluded that these failures were attributable to inadequate attention to quality assurance at Savannah River. Simply put, Departmental controls were not adequate to prevent and/or detect quality assurance problems. For example, Federal and prime contractor officials did not expressly require that subcontractors or lower-tiered vendors comply with quality assurance requirements. Additionally, management did not effectively communicate quality assurance concerns between the several Departmental program elements operating at Savannah River. The procurement and installation of these nonconforming components resulted in cost increases. For example, as of October 2008, the MOX Facility had incurred costs of more than $680,000 due to problems associated with the procurement of $11 million of nonconforming safety-class reinforcing steel. In general, the internal control weaknesses we discovered could have permitted, without detection, the procurement and installation of safety critical components that did not meet quality assurance standards. In a worst case scenario, undetected, nonconforming components could fail and injure workers or the public. In certain instances, the Department took steps to ensure that the prime contractors at Savannah River began action to remediate nonconforming components and to strengthen policies and procedures. Additionally, the Department took actions to ensure that critical components necessary for projects worked as designed by requiring that the prime contractor place personnel at manufacturers' locations. Further, the Department had suspended work with certain other manufacturers due to quality assurance problems.
- Research Organization:
- DOEIG (USDOE Office of the Inspector General (IG))
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- OSTI ID:
- 952606
- Report Number(s):
- DOE/IG-0814; TRN: US0902705
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES
AUDITS
CONSTRUCTION
DEPLETED URANIUM
FUEL ASSEMBLIES
HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES
MIXED OXIDE FUELS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
PLUTONIUM OXIDES
PROCUREMENT
QUALITY ASSURANCE
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
REMEDIAL ACTION
SAFETY
SAFETY MARGINS
SAFETY STANDARDS