Provably-Secure Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman KeyExchange
Authenticated key exchange protocols allow two participantsA and B, communicating over a public network and each holding anauthentication means, to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designedto deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B) that no otherparticipants aside from B (resp. A) can learn any information about theagreed value, and often also ensure A and B that their respective partnerhas actually computed this value. A natural extension to thiscryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging ashared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Startingfrom the famous 2-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol, andfrom its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to themulti-party setting for over a decade and completed a formal analysis inthe framework of modern cryptography in the past few years. The presentpaper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticatedgroup DH key exchange.
- Research Organization:
- COLLABORATION - DCSSI CryptoLaboratory/France
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC02-05CH11231
- OSTI ID:
- 928999
- Report Number(s):
- LBNL-54708; R&D Project: KL0501; BnR: YN0100000; TRN: US200812%%421
- Journal Information:
- ACM Transactions on Information and System Security Journal(TISSEC), Vol. 10, Issue 3; Related Information: Journal Publication Date: July 2007
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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