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Title: Criticality Safety Study of UF6and UO2F2in 8-in. Inner Diameter Piping

Abstract

The purpose of this report is to provide an evaluation of the criticality safety aspects of using up to 8-in.-inner-diameter (ID) piping as part of a system to monitor the {sup 235}U enrichment in uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas both before and after an enrichment down-blending operation. The evaluated operation does not include the blending stage but includes only the monitors and the piping directly associated with the monitors, which are in a separate room from the blending operation. There are active controls in place to limit the enrichment of the blended UF{sub 6} to a maximum of 5 weight percent (wt%) {sup 235}U. Under normal operating conditions of temperature and pressure, the UF{sub 6} will stay in the gas phase and criticality will not be credible. The two accidents of concern are solidification of the UF{sub 6} along with some hydrofluoric acid (HF) and water or moisture ingress, which would cause the UF{sub 6} gas to react and form a hydrated uranyl fluoride (UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}) solid or solution. Of these two types of accidents, the addition of water and formation of UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} is the most reactive scenario and thus limits related to UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} willmore » bound the limits related to UF{sub 6}. Two types of systems are included in the monitoring process. The first measures the enrichment of the approximately 90 wt% enriched UF{sub 6} before it is blended. This system uses a maximum 4-in.-(10.16-cm-) ID pipe, which is smaller than the 13.7-cm-cylinder-diameter subcritical limit for UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} solution of any enrichment as given in Table 1 of American National Standard ANSI/ANS-8.1.1 Therefore, this system poses no criticality concerns for either accident scenario. The second type of system includes two enrichment monitors for lower-enriched UF{sub 6}. One monitors the approximately 1.5 wt% enriched UF{sub 6} entering the blending process, and the second monitors the approximately 5 wt% enriched UF{sub 6} coming out of the blending process. Both use a maximum 8-in.-(20.32-cm-) ID piping, where the length of the larger ID piping is approximately 9.5 m. This diameter of piping is below the 26.6-cm-cylinder-diameter subcritical limit for 5 wt% enriched UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} solutions as given in Table 6 of ANSI/ANS-8.1. Therefore, for up to 5 wt% enriched UF{sub 6}, this piping does not present a criticality concern for either accident scenario. Calculations were performed to determine the enrichment level at which criticality could become a concern in these 8-in.-ID piping sections. Both unreflected and fully water-reflected conditions were considered.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
885633
Report Number(s):
ORNL/TM-2003/239
TRN: US0604065
DOE Contract Number:  
DE-AC05-00OR22725
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES, AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; ACCIDENTS; CRITICALITY; EVALUATION; HYDROFLUORIC ACID; MOISTURE; MONITORING; MONITORS; SAFETY; SOLIDIFICATION; URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE; URANYL FLUORIDES; WATER

Citation Formats

Elam, K R. Criticality Safety Study of UF6and UO2F2in 8-in. Inner Diameter Piping. United States: N. p., 2003. Web. doi:10.2172/885633.
Elam, K R. Criticality Safety Study of UF6and UO2F2in 8-in. Inner Diameter Piping. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/885633
Elam, K R. 2003. "Criticality Safety Study of UF6and UO2F2in 8-in. Inner Diameter Piping". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/885633. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/885633.
@article{osti_885633,
title = {Criticality Safety Study of UF6and UO2F2in 8-in. Inner Diameter Piping},
author = {Elam, K R},
abstractNote = {The purpose of this report is to provide an evaluation of the criticality safety aspects of using up to 8-in.-inner-diameter (ID) piping as part of a system to monitor the {sup 235}U enrichment in uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas both before and after an enrichment down-blending operation. The evaluated operation does not include the blending stage but includes only the monitors and the piping directly associated with the monitors, which are in a separate room from the blending operation. There are active controls in place to limit the enrichment of the blended UF{sub 6} to a maximum of 5 weight percent (wt%) {sup 235}U. Under normal operating conditions of temperature and pressure, the UF{sub 6} will stay in the gas phase and criticality will not be credible. The two accidents of concern are solidification of the UF{sub 6} along with some hydrofluoric acid (HF) and water or moisture ingress, which would cause the UF{sub 6} gas to react and form a hydrated uranyl fluoride (UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}) solid or solution. Of these two types of accidents, the addition of water and formation of UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} is the most reactive scenario and thus limits related to UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} will bound the limits related to UF{sub 6}. Two types of systems are included in the monitoring process. The first measures the enrichment of the approximately 90 wt% enriched UF{sub 6} before it is blended. This system uses a maximum 4-in.-(10.16-cm-) ID pipe, which is smaller than the 13.7-cm-cylinder-diameter subcritical limit for UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} solution of any enrichment as given in Table 1 of American National Standard ANSI/ANS-8.1.1 Therefore, this system poses no criticality concerns for either accident scenario. The second type of system includes two enrichment monitors for lower-enriched UF{sub 6}. One monitors the approximately 1.5 wt% enriched UF{sub 6} entering the blending process, and the second monitors the approximately 5 wt% enriched UF{sub 6} coming out of the blending process. Both use a maximum 8-in.-(20.32-cm-) ID piping, where the length of the larger ID piping is approximately 9.5 m. This diameter of piping is below the 26.6-cm-cylinder-diameter subcritical limit for 5 wt% enriched UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} solutions as given in Table 6 of ANSI/ANS-8.1. Therefore, for up to 5 wt% enriched UF{sub 6}, this piping does not present a criticality concern for either accident scenario. Calculations were performed to determine the enrichment level at which criticality could become a concern in these 8-in.-ID piping sections. Both unreflected and fully water-reflected conditions were considered.},
doi = {10.2172/885633},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/885633}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue Oct 07 00:00:00 EDT 2003},
month = {Tue Oct 07 00:00:00 EDT 2003}
}