Incentives for Cheating Given Imperfect Detection
The incentives for cheating given imperfect detection can be discussed within the context of first strike stability. The cost reduction due to is balanced against the sanctions that would be imposed if cheating was detected. For small political sanctions, the optimum level is at high levels of cheating. For large sanctions, the optimum is at quite low levels, which discourages cheating.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- M and A (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 763173
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-98-4476; TRN: AH200103%%517
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: 1 Oct 1998
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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