Transportation and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading. Final Technical Report
The authors conclude in this report that an upstream system would ensure complete regulatory coverage of transportation sector emissions in an efficient and feasible manner, and as such represents a key component of a national least-cost GHG emissions abatement strategy. The broad coverage provided by an upstream system recommends this approach over vehicle-maker based approaches, which would not cover emissions from heavy-duty vehicles and the aviation, marine and off-road sub-sectors. The on-road fleet approach unfairly and inefficiently burdens vehicle manufacturers with responsibility for emissions that they cannot control. A new vehicles approach would exclude emissions from vehicles on the road prior to program inception. The hybrid approach faces significant technical and political complications, and it is not clear that the approach would actually change behavior among vehicle makers and users, which is its main purpose. They also note that a trading system would fail to encourage many land use and infrastructure measures that affect VMT growth and GHG emissions. They recommend that this market failure be addressed by complementing the trading system with a program specifically targeting land use- and infrastructure-related activities. A key issue that must be addressed in designing a national GHG control strategy is whether or not it is necessary to guarantee GHG reductions from the transport sector. Neither an upstream system nor a downstream approach would do so, since both would direct capital to the least-cost abatement opportunities wherever they were found. They review two reasons why it may be desirable to force transportation sector reductions: first, that the long-term response to climate change will require reductions in all sectors; and second, the many ancillary benefits associated with transportation-related, and especially VMT-related, emissions reduction activities. If policy makers find it desirable to establish transportation-specific policies, they recommend (in addition to the land use policies mentioned above), that they combine an upstream trading system with a carbon efficiency standard similar to the current CAFE standard. Under this approach a fuel price signal would be complemented by incentives for manufacturers to produce more carbon efficient vehicles. To prevent vehicle manufacturers from being forced to pay more than other sectors for reducing GHG emissions, they recommend that the vehicle makers be allowed to pay a cash penalty equal to the market price of allowances in lieu of meeting carbon efficiency requirements.
- Research Organization:
- Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, DC (US)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE) (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- FC36-96GO10183
- OSTI ID:
- 755983
- Report Number(s):
- DOE/GO/10183-F; TRN: AH200029%%132
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: 1 Oct 1999
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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