Feasibility study on the verification of fresh fuel assemblies in shipping containers
The purpose of this study was to examine the feasibility of using various nondestructive measurement techniques to determine the presence of fuel assemblies inside shipping containers and to examine the feasibility of measuring the fissile content of the containers. Passive and active techniques based on both gamma and neutron assay were examined. In addition, some experiments and calculations were performed to evaluate neutron techniques. Passive counting of the 186 keV gamma from {sup 235}U is recommended for use as an attributes measurement technique. Experiments and studies indicated that a bismuth germanate (BGO) scintillator is the preferred detector. A properly designed system based on this detector will provide a compact detector that can selectively verify fuel assemblies within a shipping container while the container is in a stack of similarly loaded containers. Missing fuel assemblies will be readily detected, but gamma counting of assemblies cannot detect changes in the fissile content of the inner rods in an assembly. If a variables technique is required, it is recommended that more extensive calculations be performed and removal of the outer shipping container be considered. Marking (sealing) of the assemblies with a uniquely identifiable transponder was also considered. This would require the development of procedures that would assure proper application and removal of the seal. When change to a metal outer container occurs, the technique will no longer be useful unless a radiolucent window is included in the container. 20 refs., 7 figs., 2 tabs.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/EH
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC06-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 6591602
- Report Number(s):
- ISPO-325; PNL-7466; ON: DE91001039
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS
FISSILE MATERIALS
MEASURING METHODS
FUEL ASSEMBLIES
VERIFICATION
SPENT FUELS
TRANSPORT
ACCOUNTING
BGO DETECTORS
BWR TYPE REACTORS
CONTAINERS
FEASIBILITY STUDIES
GAMMA FUEL SCANNING
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
NEUTRON DETECTORS
SCINTILLATION COUNTING
SEALS
SPENT FUEL STORAGE
URANIUM 235
ACTINIDE ISOTOPES
ACTINIDE NUCLEI
ALPHA DECAY RADIOISOTOPES
COUNTING TECHNIQUES
ENERGY SOURCES
EVEN-ODD NUCLEI
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
FUEL SCANNING
FUELS
GAMMA RADIOGRAPHY
HEAVY NUCLEI
INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY
ISOMERIC TRANSITION ISOTOPES
ISOTOPES
MATERIALS
MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
MINUTES LIVING RADIOISOTOPES
NUCLEAR FUELS
NUCLEI
RADIATION DETECTORS
RADIOISOTOPES
REACTOR MATERIALS
REACTORS
SAFEGUARDS
SCINTILLATION COUNTERS
SOLID SCINTILLATION DETECTORS
STORAGE
URANIUM ISOTOPES
WATER COOLED REACTORS
WATER MODERATED REACTORS
YEARS LIVING RADIOISOTOPES
050900* - Nuclear Fuels- Transport
Handling
& Storage
055001 - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability- Technical Aspects
210100 - Power Reactors
Nonbreeding
Light-Water Moderated
Boiling Water Cooled