Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants

Conference · Thu Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1990

OSTI ID:6305486

Swindle, D W

Over a two and one-half year period beginning in 1981, representatives of six countries (United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, The Netherlands, and Japan) and the inspectorate organizations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM developed and agreed to a technically sound approach for verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This effort, known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), led to the first international concensus on techniques and requirements for effective verification of the absence of weapons-grade nuclear materials production. Since that agreement, research and development has continued on the radiation detection technology-based technique that technically confirms the HSP goal is achievable. However, the realities of achieving the HSP goal of effective technical verification have not yet been fully attained. Issues such as design and operating conditions unique to each gas centrifuge plant, concern about the potential for sensitive technology disclosures, and on-site support requirements have hindered full implementation and operator support of the HSP agreement. In future arms control treaties that may limit or monitor fissile material production, the negotiators must recognize and account for the realities and practicalities in verifying the absence of HEU production. This paper will describe the experiences and realities of trying to achieve the goal of developing and implementing an effective approach for verifying the absence of HEU production. 3 figs.

• Research Organization: Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, TN (USA)
• Sponsoring Organization: DOE/DP
• DOE Contract Number: AC05-84OT21400
• OSTI ID: 6305486
• Report Number(s): K/ITP-327; CONF-900384-3; ON: DE91006691
• Resource Relation: Conference: American Physical Society meeting, Anaheim, CA (USA), 12-16 Mar 1990
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR
VERIFICATION
ACCOUNTABILITY
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
IMPLEMENTATION
SAFEGUARDS
ACTINIDES
ELEMENTS
ENRICHED URANIUM
INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS
ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
METALS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
URANIUM
055000* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability