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Title: Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

Abstract

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

Authors:
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA). Technical Support Organization
OSTI Identifier:
5483046
Report Number(s):
BNL-52010
ON: DE86014888
DOE Contract Number:  
AC02-76CH00016
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Portions of this document are illegible in microfiche products. Original copy available until stock is exhausted
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY; SAFEGUARDS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION; PROLIFERATION; REPROCESSING; SPENT FUEL STORAGE; THERMONUCLEAR REACTORS; SEPARATION PROCESSES; STORAGE; 055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability- Technical Aspects

Citation Formats

Keisch, B, Auerbach, C, Fainberg, A, Fiarman, S, Fishbone, L G, Higinbotham, W A, Lemley, J R, and O'Brien, J. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies. United States: N. p., 1986. Web. doi:10.2172/5483046.
Keisch, B, Auerbach, C, Fainberg, A, Fiarman, S, Fishbone, L G, Higinbotham, W A, Lemley, J R, & O'Brien, J. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/5483046
Keisch, B, Auerbach, C, Fainberg, A, Fiarman, S, Fishbone, L G, Higinbotham, W A, Lemley, J R, and O'Brien, J. 1986. "Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/5483046. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5483046.
@article{osti_5483046,
title = {Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies},
author = {Keisch, B and Auerbach, C and Fainberg, A and Fiarman, S and Fishbone, L G and Higinbotham, W A and Lemley, J R and O'Brien, J},
abstractNote = {The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.},
doi = {10.2172/5483046},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5483046}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 1986},
month = {Sat Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 1986}
}