Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies
Abstract
The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA). Technical Support Organization
- OSTI Identifier:
- 5483046
- Report Number(s):
- BNL-52010
ON: DE86014888
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-76CH00016
- Resource Type:
- Technical Report
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: Portions of this document are illegible in microfiche products. Original copy available until stock is exhausted
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY; SAFEGUARDS; ISOTOPE SEPARATION; PROLIFERATION; REPROCESSING; SPENT FUEL STORAGE; THERMONUCLEAR REACTORS; SEPARATION PROCESSES; STORAGE; 055001* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability- Technical Aspects
Citation Formats
Keisch, B, Auerbach, C, Fainberg, A, Fiarman, S, Fishbone, L G, Higinbotham, W A, Lemley, J R, and O'Brien, J. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies. United States: N. p., 1986.
Web. doi:10.2172/5483046.
Keisch, B, Auerbach, C, Fainberg, A, Fiarman, S, Fishbone, L G, Higinbotham, W A, Lemley, J R, & O'Brien, J. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/5483046
Keisch, B, Auerbach, C, Fainberg, A, Fiarman, S, Fishbone, L G, Higinbotham, W A, Lemley, J R, and O'Brien, J. 1986.
"Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/5483046. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5483046.
@article{osti_5483046,
title = {Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies},
author = {Keisch, B and Auerbach, C and Fainberg, A and Fiarman, S and Fishbone, L G and Higinbotham, W A and Lemley, J R and O'Brien, J},
abstractNote = {The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.},
doi = {10.2172/5483046},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5483046},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 1986},
month = {Sat Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 1986}
}