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Title: Technologies for detection of nuclear materials

Conference ·
OSTI ID:221905

Detection of smuggled nuclear materials at transit points requires monitoring unknown samples in large closed packages. This review contends that high-confidence nuclear-material detection requires induced fission as the primary mechanism, with passive radiation screening in a complementary role. With the right equipment, even small quantities of nuclear materials are detectable with a high probability at transit points. The equipment could also be linked synergistically with detectors of other contrabond. For screening postal mail and packages, passive monitors are probably more cost-effective. When a suspicious item is detected, a single active probe could then be used. Until active systems become mass produced, this two-stage screening/interrogation role for active/passive equipment is more economic for cargo at border crossings. For widespread monitoring of nuclear smuggling, it will probably be necessary to develop a system for simultaneously detecting most categories of contraband, including explosives and illicit drugs. With control of nuclear materials at known storage sites being the first line of defense, detection capabilities at international borders could establish a viable second line of defense against smuggling.

Research Organization:
Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
DOE Contract Number:
W-31109-ENG-38
OSTI ID:
221905
Report Number(s):
ANL/TD/CP-89753; CONF-9604126-4; ON: DE96009428; TRN: 96:012267
Resource Relation:
Conference: Moscow International Science and Technology Center symposium on nuclear physics methods for detecting smuggled explosives and nuclear materials, Obninsk (Russian Federation), 8-11 Apr 1996; Other Information: PBD: 30 Mar 1996
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English