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Title: Mechanical Engineering Safety Note: Analysis and Control of Hazards Associated with NIF Capacitor Module Events

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/15007228· OSTI ID:15007228

The NIF capacitor module was reviewed with respect to pressure venting and shrapnel containment during failures. A modified module concept was proposed that would adequately vent the pressure, yet be effective at containing shrapnel. Two large vents are provided on each side of the module. These have fixed vent areas, and are immediately accessible for pressure venting at the beginning of a pressure transient. A shrapnel shield is located on the outside of each vent opening forming a chute. The chute contains a collimator. This increases the number of bounces that shrapnel must take on the way out, and directs the shrapnel to the trap beneath. The trap contains a depth of clear pine, sufficient to completely absorb the energy of even the most energetic fragment considered. Based on a review of the evidence from past capacitor failures at the FANTM facility at Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, and additional theoretical estimates, the peak pressure generated in the module during explosive events was estimated to be less than 40 psig. This internal pressure in the FANTM module appears to be tolerable, as only minor damage to the module and to internal components was observed after events. The new module concept proposed here provides increased venting area, fully available at the initiation of an event. It is expected that even less damage would be observed if an event occurred in a module with this design. The module joints and connections were formally reviewed with respect to their tolerance to a brief internal pressure as high as 40 psig. With minor modifications that have been incorporated into the design, the module was shown to maintain its integrity during such events. Some of the calculations performed estimated the quantity of dielectric oil that could be involved in a capacitor failure. It was determined that a very small amount of the available oil would contribute to the explosive event, on the order of 500 g or less. This is a small fraction of the total free oil available in a capacitor (approximately 10,900 g), on the order of 5% or less. The estimates of module pressure were used to estimate the potential overpressure in the capacitor bays after an event. It was shown that the expected capacitor bay overpressure would be less than the structural tolerance of the walls. Thus, it does not appear necessary to provide any pressure relief for the capacitor bays. The ray tracing analysis showed the new module concept to be 100% effective at containing fragments generated during the events. The analysis demonstrated that all fragments would impact an energy absorbing surface on the way out of the module. Thus, there is high confidence that energetic fragments will not escape the module. However, since the module was not tested, it was recommended that a form of secondary containment on the walls of the capacitor bays (e.g., 1.0 inch of fire-retardant plywood) be provided. Any doors to the exterior of the capacitor bays should be of equivalent thickness of steel or suitably armed with a thickness of plywood. Penetrations in the ceiling of the interior bays (leading to the mechanical equipment room) do not require additional protection to form a secondary barrier. The mezzanine and the air handling units (penetrations lead directly to the air handling units) provide a sufficient second layer of protection.

Research Organization:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
US Department of Energy (US)
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
OSTI ID:
15007228
Report Number(s):
UCRL-ID-145413; TRN: US200414%%464
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 1 Aug 2001
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English