Detector Requirements to Curb Nuclear Smuggling
The problem of stopping nuclear smuggling of terrorist nuclear devices is a complex one, owing to the variety of pathways by which such a device can be transported. To fashion new detection systems that improve the chances of detecting such a device, it is important to know the various requirements and conditions that would be imposed on them by both the types of devices that might be smuggled and by the requirement that it not overly interfere with the transportation of legitimate goods. Requirements vary greatly from low-volume border crossings to high-volume industrial container ports, and the design of systems for them is likely to be quite different. There is also a further need to detect these devices if they are brought into a country via illicit routes, i.e., those which do not pass through customs posts, but travel overland though open space or to a smaller, unguarded airport or seaport. This paper describes some generic uses of detectors, how they need to be integrated into customs or other law enforcement systems, and what the specifications for such detectors might be.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- US Department of Energy (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 15002887
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-JC-146018; TRN: US0402399
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers Conference 2001 - Nuclear Science Symposium, San Diego, CA (US), 11/06/2001--11/10/2001; Other Information: PBD: 14 Nov 2001
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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