Prioritizing like nuclear smugglers
An individual or group attempting to smuggle nuclear material out of a country has a choice of what border crossing to use and how to do it. If it is possible to think like a smuggler and determine what preferences one would have, then we could protect those smuggler-preferred border crossings first. Thinking like a smuggler requires that one understand a host of things: who is likely to smuggle and what might they have obtained, where they might have gotten it, and where they would like to deliver or sell it, how they will attempt to pass customs, how they might travel on both sides of the border, and what influences they might have on customs officials. After collecting data on criminology, geography, and much else, it is necessary to paste the data together into scenarios to ensure that self-consistent smuggling plans are created. These lead to counter-smuggling opportunities. Smuggling by amateurs turns out to be of a different class than professional smuggling, and needs to be countered differently. This work also assists in formulating key policy questions useful to guide counter-smuggling efforts. This methodology was developed for DOE/NN-43 for assistance with prioritization within the Second Line of Defense program.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Defense Programs (DP) (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 13755
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-JC-135071; GC0404000; GC0404000; TRN: US0110739
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 40th Annual Meeting, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, AZ (US), 07/25/1999--07/29/1999; Other Information: PBD: 1 Jul 1999
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Nuclear smugglers
Detector Requirements to Curb Nuclear Smuggling