Report on Concepts & Approaches for SSBD for eCHEM

Technical Report · Thu Sep 29 00:00:00 EDT 2016

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/1329633· OSTI ID:1329633

Murphy, Chantell Lynne-Marie ^[1]

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1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

The verification of special nuclear material (SNM) in spent fuel pyroprocessing is an important safeguards challenge. The detection of spontaneous fission (SF) neutrons from curium is an accepted, non-destructive technique that has been applied to verify special nuclear material (SNM) content in used fuel and other materials in the fuel cycle. The nuclear material accounting (NMA) technique at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute’s Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is based on the Cm balance technique. Several publications have demonstrated the safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities as a complementary measure to NMA. More recently, this concept was expanded and preliminarily demonstrated for pyroprocessing. The concept of Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) is part of this expansion, and is built around the interpretation of input from various sensors in a declared facility coupled with complementary NMA methods to increase confidence and lower standard error inventory differences (SEID). The SBS methodology was conceptually developed and relies on near real time analysis of process monitoring data to detect material diversion complemented by robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures. This work demonstrates one example of how the SBS framework can be used in the electrorefiner. In this SBS application, a combination of cyclic voltammetry (CV) and neutron counting is applied to track and monitor Pu mass balance. The main purpose of this experiment is to determine if meaningful information can be gained from CV measurements with regard to the Mg/Gd ratio. This data will be coupled with ICP-MS to verify Gd concentrations and analyzed for statistical significance. It is expected the CV data will register a significant change under the off-normal operating conditions. Knowing how to identify and interpret those changes may help inform how to target more traditional neutron counting methods, which could support a more efficient safeguards system. The experimental results will be compared with theoretical calculations and the ERAD simulations.

• Research Organization: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC52-06NA25396
• OSTI ID: 1329633
• Report Number(s): LA-UR-16-27463; TRN: US1700387
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
REPROCESSING
SPENT FUELS
FISSILE MATERIALS
FISSION NEUTRONS
PLUTONIUM
MASS BALANCE
MONITORING
ICP MASS SPECTROSCOPY
CURIUM
SAFEGUARDS
SPONTANEOUS FISSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS
CONCENTRATION RATIO
FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS
ACCOUNTING
DETECTION
SIMULATION
VERIFICATION
VOLTAMETRY
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION