Environmental sampling: Issues for the cut-off regime
The fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) initiative under the Conference on Disarmament mandate is envisioned to include certain aspects of environmental sampling and monitoring. One of the intents of this treaty is to bring certain non-NPT signatories (e.g., threshold states) under this treaty agreement along with the nuclear weapon states (NWSs). This paper provides a brief overview of some of the relevant issues that may be involved in the implementation and use of environmental monitoring for (1) verification of the cut-off regime declarations, (2) the detection of undeclared activities, and, (3) application in non-routine inspections. The intent is to provide backstopping information important for treaty negotiators. Specific issues addressed within this paper include signature sampling, differences in the proposed detection regime, potential signature integrators, specific examples and spoofing concerns. Many of these issues must be carefully considered and weighed in order to create a credibly verifiable inspection regime. Importantly, the cut-off treaty must enable nondiscriminatory implementation, while carefully assuring that nonproliferation treaty requirements are maintained (i.e., preventing unintentional release of critical weapons design information--potentially through environmental sampling and analysis).
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 106750
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-95-3095; CONF-9508162-1; ON: DE96000048; TRN: 95:022042
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Fillile material cut-off treaty non-routine inspection workshop, Washington, DC (United States), 29 Aug 1995; Other Information: PBD: [1995]
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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